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ARTICLES 
Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information 
in a Networked World 
ARI EZRA W ALDMAN* 
This Article is the first of a series discussing the legal and sociologi-
cal aspects of information privacy, arguing that private contexts are 
defined by relationships of trust among individuals. The argument 
reorients privacy scholarship from an individual right to social rela-
tionships of disclosure. This has implications for a wide variety of 
vexing problems of modern privacy law, from limited disclosures to 
"revenge porn. " 
The common everyday understanding is that privacy is about choice, 
autonomy, and individual freedom. It encompasses the individual's 
right to determine what he will keep hidden and what, how, and when 
he will disclose to the public. Privacy is his respite from the prying, 
conformist eyes of the rest of the world and his expectation that the 
things about himself that he wants to keep private will remain so. 
These ways of understanding privacy are variations on the same 
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theme: that privacy is a tool of the individual "against the world. " 
None of them adequately protect personal privacy where sharing per-
sonal information with others is a precondition of modem life. 
This Article argues that in this information disclosure context, pri-
vacy is really about trust. Rather than accept the traditional division 
between public and private, and rather than begin and end the dis-
cussion of privacy as an individual right, this Article bridges social 
science and the law to argue that disclosures in contexts of trust are 
private. Trusting relationships are determined by the presence of 
experience, strong overlapping networks, identity sharing, and other 
indicia derived from the totality of the circumstances. This conceptu-
alization of privacy, and its related ways of defining when invasions 
of privacy occur, more effectively protects privacy in a modem digi-
tal world. The Article argues that law of privacy, therefore, should be 
used to protect relationships of trust, rather than to protect a collec-
tion of individual rights. To this end, this Article proposes a robust 
tort for breach of confidentiality as one tool to protect privacy in a 
networked world and illustrates the functionality of this tort through 
a case study of privacy in previously disclosed information. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most individuals think of the private world as a place distinct or 
separate from other people. Private spheres presume the existence of 
public spheres, but only as things from which to detach. I disagree. What 
follows is a reorientation of the way we think about privacy in the infor-
mation-sharing context around sociological principles of interpersonal 
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trust rather than rights-based doctrines of autonomy and choice. The 
argument is simple: privacy is not exclusively bound up with concepts 
of choice, autonomy, or seclusion; rather, privacy is a social fact-a 
constant in our lives-that is based on relationships of trust among indi-
viduals and between individuals and institutions. In short, we share 
when we trust; we retain privacy rights and interests in contexts of trust. 
Or, put another way, what makes expectations of privacy reasonable are 
expectations of trust. 
Privacy scholarship is no stranger to social theory, but the relation-
ship is still underdeveloped. Both lawyers and sociologists appear to 
have taken on the traditional assumption that the private world is distinct 
from the public world. In one of his major works, Erving Goffman 
lamented the "process of personal identification," or how easy it is to 
amass personal information about any given individual and make public 
his social identity.' He saw individuals as nodes at the center of several 
social networks that knew different things about those individuals, thus 
recognizing that some personal information can be withheld, or kept pri-
vate, from the general public at the individual's discretion? And 
Goffman is not alone. The sociologist Georg Simmel began his seminal 
article, The Sociology of Secrets and of Secret Societies, by stating that 
"[a]ll relationships of people to each other rest ... upon the precondition 
that they know something about each other,"3 but recognizing that we 
rarely, if ever, know everything about another person.4 Our perceptions 
of others, based on what we know, what we think we know, and both 
true and misleading facets of personality, are true for us,S even if they 
are manipulated by a delicate balance between secrets and disclosures: 
"Our fellow man," Simmel wrote, "either may voluntarily reveal to us 
the truth about himself, or by dissimulation he may deceive us as to the 
truth."6 He may, in other words, choose to keep certain things private 
and choose to make certain things public. 
Public opinion polls suggest that when most people think of pri-
vacy and private things, they think of protection, being hidden, or sepa-
1. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 57 (1963) 
[hereinafter STIGMA]. 
2. [d. at 72. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PuBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE 
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF GATHERINGS (1963) [hereinafter BEHAVIOR IN PuBLIC PLACES] 
(discussing behavior in public places, specifically the aspect of public order pertaining to the 
conduct of individuals by virtue of their presence among others). 
3. Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies, 11 AM. J. Soc. 441, 441 
(1906). 
4. !d. at 442. 
5. [d. at 443. 
6. [d. at~5. 
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ration.7 The popular view is that private things are walled off from 
others or limited to the very few. Some consider certain things and 
places, like a diary or a bathroom, private because of the very fact that 
they are not open for public consumption and separated from the pub-
lic's access. Privacy has come to be defined by walls or property lines,s 
or the "loss of shared experience," according to the social psychologists 
Robert Laufer and Maxine Wolfe.9 
The traditional view of privacy is similar, focusing less on spaces 
than on what it means to define a place or a thing as private. For many, 
privacy is about choice, autonomy, and individual freedom. It encom-
passes the individual's right to determine what he will keep hidden and 
what, how, and when he will disclose to the public. Privacy is his respite 
from the prying, conformist eyes of the rest of the world and his expec-
tation that the things about himself that he wants to keep private will 
remain so. I will call this, generally, the "rights conceptions of privacy" 
to evoke the centrality of the individual, his inviolability, and the Lock-
ean and Kantian origins of this idea. 10 
Under this umbrella are two seemingly distinct strands. The first, 
which I will call negative, sees the private sphere as a place of freedom 
from something. It includes notions of privacy based on seclusion, sepa-
ration, and private spaces, as well as conceptions based on the sanctity 
of private things, like discrediting secrets or intimate informationY 
Common to these ways of thinking about privacy is an element of sepa-
ration, suggesting that they provide freedom from the public eye. The 
second rights conception of privacy is positive. This view retains the 
assumption of separation, but uses it for a different purpose-namely, 
for the opportunity to grow, develop, and realize our full potential as 
free persons. It conceives of privacy as affirmatively for something, as 
7. See, e.g., SUSANNAH Fox, TRUST AND PRIVACY ONLINE: WHY AMERICANS WANT TO 
REWRITE THE RULES, PEw REs. INTERNET PROJECT 2, 4 (2000), available at http://www.pewinter 
net.org/files/old-mediaJlFileslReports/2000IPIP _ TrusCPrivacy _Report.pdf.pdf (explaining that 
Americans show "great concern" about their privacy, including 84% of respondents stating that 
they worry about "businesses or people they don't know getting personal information about 
themselves or their families"). 
8. See Orin S. Kerr, The Founh Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809-27 (2004) (reviewing Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and concluding that "both before and after Katz [v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967),] Fourth Amendment protections have mostly matched the contours of real property law"). 
9. Robert S. Laufer & Maxine Wolfe, Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue: A 
Multidimensional Developmental Theory, 33 J. Soc. ISSUES 22, 23 (1977) (emphasis added). 
10. Julie Cohen has also connected conventional privacy theories to liberal political 
philosophy. See JUUE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE 
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16-20, 107-26 (2012). 
II. See infra Part I1.A. 
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necessary for full realization of the liberal, autonomous self. 12 
But distinguishing between the public and private assumes, without 
evidence, the normative implications of the distinction: that privacy is 
always going to be something different, separate, or apart from the pub-
lic. 13 Nor is a public-private distinction either a theory of privacy or 
particularly helpful in applying a theory to answer questions of law and 
policy. 
The rights conceptions of privacy, as Dan Solove argued in his arti-
cle, Conceptualizing Privacy, suffer from several flaws. 14 Professor 
Solove argues that they are at times too broad-potentially limitless and 
unworkable-or too narrow-failing to account for many things we 
would naturally consider private. 15 I share some of these criticisms. I 
also argue that the rights conceptions of privacy are too simple. Econo-
mists like Alessandro Acquisti,16 legal scholars like Lior Strahilevitz,17 
culture and media scholars like Helen Nissenbaum,18 and surveys con-
ducted by the Pew Internet and American Life Project l9 reveal that shar-
ing and online social life are far more nuanced. Together, their work 
suggests that free choice is not the shibboleth of privacy in the informa-
tion-sharing context. There is more to it. I argue that the missing piece is 
trust. 
Trust is a "social fact" of cooperative behavior.20 It is a sociological 
12. See infra Part II.B. 
13. We need look no further than Catherine MacKinnon's argument that privacy law has 
created an unregulated "other" sphere that endangers women for proof that the traditional public-
private distinction carries normative burdens. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A 
FEMrNIST THEORY OF THE STATE 35-36, 168-69, 192-94 (1989). 
14. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1087, 1088-126 (2002). 
IS. See id. at 1092. 
16. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual 
Decision Making, 3 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 26 (2005) (investigating the drivers and apparent 
inconsistencies of privacy decisionmaking and behavior). 
17. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 919 (2005) (arguing that insights from literature on social networks and information 
dissemination can help provide courts with a "coherent and consistent methodology for 
determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular fact that 
he has shared with one or more people"). 
18. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 3 (2010) [hereinafter NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT] (a book 
about privacy that explains how "the huge and growing set of technical systems and technology-
based practices have provoked ... anxiety, protest, and resistance in the name of privacy"); Helen 
Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REv. 119 (2004) [hereinafter 
Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity] (arguing that contextual integrity is the appropriate 
benchmark of privacy). 
19. About the Project, PEw INTERNET REs. PROJECT, http://www.pewinternet.org/aboutl (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2014) (exploring the impact of the Internet on families, communities, work and 
home, daily life, education, health care, and civic and political life). 
20. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 50--51 (Steven Lukes ed., W.O. 
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institution that is manifested by reciprocal exchanges and assumptions 
about one's interactional partner.21 In this Article, I employ a generally 
accepted definition of interpersonal trust from the sociological literature: 
trust is an expectation regarding the future actions and intentions of par-
ticular people or groups of people.22 It is, to use a phrase from the soci-
ologists J. David Lewis and Andrew Weigert, a "functional necessity for 
society"23 because, among other things, it greases the wheels of effective 
sharing: you interact when you trust. In this Article, I argue that spheres 
of privacy mirror spheres of trust: when we trust, we share; when we do 
not trust, we do not share. We know this because our sense of when our 
privacy is invaded is similar to the sense of our trust being breached. 
Empirical research lends strong credibility to this hypothesis. When 
sharing occurs in contexts of trust, the law of privacy-whether through 
tort, constitutional, or statutory law-should protect that incident of 
sharing against subsequent misuse or wider disclosure. 
Privacy-as-trust has several advantages over its competitors. It is 
both pragmatic-it is based on how we actually perceive, understand, 
and manipulate privacy in everyday life-and clear-it simplifies a 
complex and amorphous concept and offers an explanation common to 
privacy interests in all contexts. Where information disclosure occurs in 
a context of reasonable trust, privacy law should protect that information 
as against a subsequent, wider disclosure outside the bounds of trust, 
whether to a wide audience or a snooping government agency. The the-
ory reflects real behavior, rather than visceral whims of a public 
responding to biased survey questions. Importantly, trust is also an over-
whelmingly positive force in society and, therefore, is a norm to be pro-
tected and fostered by law. 
This project has a simple, but ambitious goal: to solve ongoing pri-
vacy law and policy problems by focusing information privacy law on 
protecting relationships of trust. To be clear, this Article's analysis is 
restricted to privacy in the information-sharing context, which, although 
exceptionally important given the terabytes of personal data we share 
with third parties,24 only captures one comer of the world of privacy 
law. In Part IT, I review the current legal, sociological, and philosophical 
Halls trans., 1st Am. Ed., The Free Press 1982) (1895), available at http://comparsociology.comJ 
wp-contentluploadsl20 13/02IEmile-Durkheim-Rules-of-SociologicaI-Method-1982. pdf. 
21. See 1. David Lewis & Andrew 1. Weigert, Social Atomism, Holism, and Trust, 26 Soc. Q. 
455, 456 (1985). 
22. See generally, e.g., RANDY BORUM, THE SCIENCE OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST (2010), 
available at http://scholarcommons.usf.edulcgilviewcontent.cgi?articIe=1573&contextIp_facpub. 
23. Id. 
24. See, e.g., DANIEL 1. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE (2004) [hereinafter DIGITAL PERSON]; FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box 
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
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understandings of privacy, arguing that where some embody a negative 
rights idea of freedom from intrusion and where others reflect the posi-
tive rights ideas of autonomy and choice, most assume a public-private 
distinction and rest on the primacy of the detached individual over his 
social self. In this way, these conceptions reflect the Lockean and Kant-
ian origins of liberal political theory. Relying in part on the work of Dan 
Solove and other privacy scholars, I critique these conceptions of pri-
vacy as too rigid and inadequate to protect modem sharing. I also use 
recent sociological and economic studies to prove that they conflict with 
observable behavior. I conclude this section by addressing Professor 
Solove's powerful critique of the literature, arguing that his approach is 
too indeterminate to rescue privacy from its weak analytical state. 
Part III takes up the challenge of looking at privacy from a practi-
cal, sociological perspective. I argue for privacy-as-trust by first teasing 
out social elements that have gone unnoticed, ignored, or misinterpreted 
in the privacy literature. I depart from the conventional understanding of 
privacy and argue that privacy-as-trust is a social behavior that makes 
interaction and sharing possible. After laying out the argument in detail, 
I discuss theoretical benefits of this conception of privacy. 
Finally, I use Part IV to begin considering some of the legal impli-
cations of privacy-as-trust. I first show how privacy-as-trust leads 
directly to a robust tort for breach of confidentiality as developed by 
modem jurisprudence in Great Britain. In part, this analysis stands on 
the shoulders of the historical analysis of the tort by Neil Richards and 
Dan Solove, but moves beyond their work by learning the lessons of 
privacy-as-trust. I then apply the tort to privacy interests in information 
previously disclosed to a small group. This example is merely a case 
study; a comprehensive analysis of every privacy problem and every 
privacy rule, decision, and statute is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Privacy-as-trust and its robust tort of confidentiality, however, provide a 
workable solution to problems of modem information sharing. I then 
conclude with a pathway for future research. 
II. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: RIGHTS-BASED 
THEORIES OF PRIVACY 
The idea of privacy seems universal,25 but the definition is elu-
sive?6 As Dan Solove has argued, the widespread agreement about the 
need for privacy exists in a world where the word "privacy" seems to 
25. See Barrington Moore, Jr., Privacy, 35 SOC'y 287, 292 (1998) ("[I]t seems safe to posit at 
least a desire for privacy as a panhuman trait."). 
26. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 479-82 (2006). 
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mean different things to different people.27 I argue that the disagreement 
is only skin deep. Outside of the ancient concept of privacy as, literally, 
privation,2s there is actually widespread agreement about the classical 
rights-based assumptions underpinning the ways we understand privacy. 
Consider the philosopher Howard B. White's list of what privacy means: 
A 'right to be let alone,' as Warren and Brandeis called it, means 
more than to have one's papers secure from official scrutiny or one's 
photographs reserved for one's friends. It means a right to choose a 
way of life in which sequestration is possible, and it means that that 
choice is in some way acceptable to liberal society, a good choice. It 
means the association of what may be distinct things: the private 
sphere as against publicity, the private life as against the public life, 
and a private task as against a public task.29 
All of these ideas-the right to be let alone,30 secrecy and confidential-
ity, autonomy, and the separation of the personal and the public-are 
rights-based: they reflect the Lockean and Kantian ideal of the primacy 
of the individual over society. 
Despite the differences between Lockean and Kantian theory,31 
they are united by the respect they offer the individual and individual 
rights. And given the pervasiveness of both philosophies in the Ameri-
27. See Solove, supra note 14, at 1088-90. 
28. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDmoN 58 (1958). 
29. Howard B. White, The Right to Privacy, 18 Soc. REs. 171, 172 (1951). 
30. This phrase refers to the fonnulation of the right to privacy in a seminal article written by 
the Boston attorney Samuel Warren and future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. See Samuel 
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890). Most 
privacy scholars and legal historians credit this article as the beginning of legal privacy studies. 
31. Lockean and Kantian liberalism offer strong theoretical bases for structuring society 
around the individual, and both are reflected in the conventional views on privacy. For Locke's 
discussion of individual freedom, see JOHN LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 4, 123, 
243 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980); see also, e.g., ROGERS M. SMITH, 
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15, 47 (1990); LoCKE's MORAL, POLmCAL 
AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (J.R. Milton ed., 1999) (a collection of essays discussing Locke's 
political philosophy); JAMES TULLY, AN ApPROACH TO POLmCAL PHILOSOPHY: LOCKE IN 
CONTEXTS (1993) (interpreting Locke's political philosophy). The goal of a Lockean society, 
Rogers Smith argues, is a liberal goal-namely, the "achieve[ment of] what are still individual 
goods, be they individual preservation or a more expanded set of individual rights." SMITH, supra 
at 47. For insightful summaries, analyses, and critiques of Kant's inviolable respect for the 
individual, see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 154-57 (Lara 
Denis ed., Thomas K. Abbott trans., 2005); see also Christine Korsgaard, Professor of Law, 
Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals, Tanner Lecture on Human Values 5, 
12 (Feb. 6, 2004), available at http://tannerlectures.utah.eduCdocuments/a-to-zIk/ 
korsgaard_2005.pdf; see generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1 
(1982) (discussing "a liberalism in which the notions of justice, fairness, and individual rights play 
a central role, and which is indebted to Kant for much of its philosophical foundation"). I have 
argued elsewhere that Kantian liberalism is at the heart of our Internet free speech jurisprudence. 
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Durkheim's Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online Society, 7 
N.Y.U.1. L. & LIBERTY 355, 371 (2013). 
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can legal tradition,32 it is no surprise that the conventional theories of 
privacy also reflect these ideals. Much privacy theory is focused on indi-
vidual freedom and not only sees the individual as the locus of privacy 
rights, but also sees the protection of individual freedom as the ultimate 
goal of privacy. This section argues that this rights-based foundation 
underlies all of the conventional theories of privacy. These theories can 
be divided into two categories. Some theories of privacy concern nega-
tive rights, or freedom from something, whether it is freedom from 
others, from conformity, or from publicity, for example. Other theories 
concern positive rights, or the freedom for something, including full 
autonomy, the formation of ideas, or the development of a rich concep-
tion of personhood. In all cases, these theories reflect quite a bit of 
agreement. But, as I will argue later, this general agreement gets us no 
closer to a coherent, workable understanding of privacy that reflects 
behavior in everyday life and can be used by judges and policymakers to 
answer information-sharing problems of privacy law. 
A. Privacy as Freedom From 
A central pillar of liberal theory is negative freedom, the freedom 
from intrusion, encroachment, or violation from the state or other peo-
ple. I argue that several conventional ways of thinking about privacy 
reflect the notion that privacy offers freedom from others. For example, 
many scholars think about privacy as offering a retreat, respite, or sepa-
ration from the world. They sometimes buttress those theories with spa-
tial analogies, suggesting that there is something special about private 
versus public spaces. Though this idea has deeply penetrated the privacy 
literature, it actually limits privacy rights, fails to adequately account for 
modem technological developments affecting privacy, and reflects a 
cursory understanding of the literature. In place of a simple theory of 
separation, some scholars shift from a focus on the act of sequestration 
to the underlying thing being sequestered, understanding privacy as 
something inherent in the concepts of secrets and intimacy. However, 
this subjective idea is too often bound up with a normative moral judg-
ment that secrets are discrediting or, to use the sociologist'S term, devi-
32. On Locke, see generally Waldman, supra note 31 (discussing the impact of liberal theory, 
in general). See also JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OrnER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 28-29 (3d ed. 2008); Adam Mossoff, Locke's 
Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 155 (2002) ("A mere listing of the primary and 
secondary sources-from the Founding Fathers to today-that explicitly refer to Locke or 
implicitly invoke his ideas would rival the Encyclopaedia Britannica in length. His labor argument 
for property, in particular, has been especially influential."). On Kant, see, for example, MICHAEL 
J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY's DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PuBLiC PHILOSOPHY 43-119 
(1996) (arguing that Kantian and neo-Kantian liberal theory permeates American constitutional 
law). 
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ant, that it fails to capture much of the privacy space. In all cases, 
though, these conceptions of privacy reflect rights theory's primacy of 
the individual because they involve the individual's power to separate 
from the world and decide for himself what is and what is not private. 
1. SEPARATION, SEQUESTRATION, AND EXCLUSION 
If privacy is conceived as freedom from others or the state, then it 
makes sense that much of the literature would focus on seclusion, sepa-
ration from the public eye, and the exclusion of others from certain 
aspects of personal life. These conceptions align closely with Locke's 
theory of property and individual rights and yet do not adequately pro-
tect privacy. 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis began by conceiving of privacy 
as some form of separation when they argued that modem technology 
had made "solitude" and "retreat from the world" more necessary than 
ever.33 Anita Allen explained her vision of privacy by listing examples 
that involved seclusion: "4,OOO-square-foot homes nestled among 
mature trees in bucolic suburbs," "vacation[ing] at remote resorts," and 
"spend[ing] an hour alone with a book behind closed doors."34 She was 
suggesting that any every day and theoretical concept of privacy had to 
include some measure of aloneness or separation because, otherwise, the 
public had access to you. David O'Brien echoed this seemingly symbi-
otic relationship when he called privacy "the existential condition of 
limited access" brought on by the condition of being alone?5 And How-
ard White similarly described privacy as a "right against the world," or a 
right that makes sequestration possible and keeps us free from all man-
ner of intrusions by others?6 It seems, then, that the separation idea has 
taken hold in the legal, political, and philosophical literatures on 
privacy.37 
This understanding is common among social theorists, as well. 
Donald Ball, a sociologist, defined privacy as the "ability to engage in 
33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at. 196. 
34. Anita L. Allen, Is Privacy Now Possible? A Brief History of an Obsession, 68 Soc. REs. 
301, 301 (2001). 
35. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PuBLIC POLICY 16 (1979). 
36. White, supra note 29, at 172. 
37. See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 10"':11 
(1983) ("Privacy fils the condition of being protected from unwanted access by others-either 
physical access, personal information, or attention."). The public sphere was always the arena of 
life lived in the open, whereas the private sphere was a "secluded life, a life separated from the 
compelling burdens of public authority." See, e.g., Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and 
Vicissitudes, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281,283 (1966). 
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actIvItIes without being observed."38 The psychologists Robert Laufer 
and Maxine Wolfe, who studied notions of privacy among youth, under-
stood it to be the process of separation of an individual from his environ-
ment. 39 That separation could be physical-literally hiding away in a 
space-or psychological-denying warmth, whispering, showing emo-
tional distance. But in each case, a personal zone is created. Raymond 
Williams, a cultural critic and historian, understood privacy to be "the 
ultimate generalized privilege ... of seclusion and protection from 
others (the public)."40 Notions of seclusion and protection necessarily 
take on a "me against the world" bias, privileging the individual as the 
locus of privacy rights. 
They also have distinct spatial overtones.41 Much of the social sci-
ence literature conceiving of privacy as sequestration uses the rhetoric of 
spaces, territories, walls, and other indicators of literal separation to sup-
port theoretical arguments. For example, Joseph Rykwert, a historian of 
the ancient world, argued that there was a direct correspondence 
between ancient conceptions of privacy and the women's rooms in the 
home, on the one hand, and public behavior and the men's rooms, on the 
other.42 The distinction in the home was literal. In his work on secret 
societies, Georg Simmel not only argued that "detachment" and "exclu-
sion" were necessary for the success of a secret organization, but analo-
gized the role of the secret to a wall of separation: "Their secret 
encircles them like a boundary, beyond which there is nothing but 
the ... antithetic, which therefore shuts up the society within itself as a 
complete unity."43 And when the sociologist Robert Maxwell wanted to 
study sexual intimacy in pre-industrial societies, he chose to study wall 
construction, material permeability, and hidden spaces to determine if 
there was a relationship between intimacy norms in the greater society 
and private behavior.44 
38. Donald w. Ball, Privacy, Publicity, Deviance and Control, 18 PAC. Soc. REV. 259, 260 
(1975). 
39. Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 9, at 26-27. 
40. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 243 
(1985). 
41. Helen Nissenbaum noted that protecting private spaces has been an animating principle of 
much of traditional privacy law and policy. See Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 
supra note 18, at 129-31. 
42. See Joseph Rykwert, Privacy in Antiquity, 68 Soc. RES. 29, 33-34 (2001). 
43. Simmel, supra note 3, at 484. 
44. See Robert J. Maxwell, Onstage and Offstage Sex: Exploring an Hypothesis, I CORNELL 
J. SOC. REL. 75, 75-82 (1967) (arguing that stricter intimacy norms in societies were correlated 
with increased privacy, suggesting that individuals use self-help to find ways to hide their 
behaviors). Greater study is warranted here. Maxwell argued that certain behavior had to be 
hidden in societies that had strict rules about deviance and sex because publicity of those 
behaviors would weaken the norms against them. Id. at 75-76. However, he never considered the 
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For other scholars, the evidence is in the rhetoric they use to 
explain their views on privacy. Jeffrey Rosen talked about Hillary Clin-
ton's decision to tolerate her husband's extramarital affair as a decision 
"shielded" by privacy.45 Milton Konvitz, a legal theorist, argued that 
privacy is a "sphere of space" that the public cannot enter or contro1.46 
For yet others, privacy requires "boundaries" and a "territory" of their 
own that was "insulated" from the rest of the world.47 
An admittedly cursory reading of the work of Erving Goffman ech-
oes the privacy-as-sequestration idea with similar spatial analogies. 
Goffman defined private places as "soundproof regions where only 
members or invitees gather."48 They are regions physically bounded by 
walls or doors that offer physical separation between people and 
between different kinds of social interaction.49 Stalls are perfect exam-
ples.50 Clothing, personal possessions, and spaces that you own also pro-
vide individuals with a certain amount of spatial privacy, allowing total 
exclusion of others.51 
Goffman's backstage/front stage distinction is the best analogy for 
a spatial theory of privacy. In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 
Goffman analyzes social interaction through an extended theatrical con-
ceit, comparing individuals to actors on a stage.52 He separates the front 
stage, where the performance of social interaction occurs,53 and the 
backstage, where individuals can drop the fa~ade of performance. 54 And 
he describes them as places, or "setting[s]."55 The backstage is a place of 
hiding,56 so that devices like telephones, closets, and bathrooms could 
"be used 'privately."'57 It is also cut off from the front stage by a parti-
tion, passageway, or curtain.58 The backstage, then, is defined by provid-
fact that societies with stronger norms against sexual practices may also have official and 
unofficial enforcement procedures for ferreting out deviant behavior. 
45. See Jeffrey Rosen, Out of Context: The Purposes of Privacy, 68 Soc. REs. 209, 217 
(2001). 
46. See Milton R. Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 272, 279-80 (1966); see also Solove, supra note 14, at 1131. 
47. See Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is Not an Isolated Freedom, in NOMOS XIII: PRIvACY 71, 72 
(1. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971) (quoted in Solove, supra note 14, at 1131). 
48. BEHAVIOR IN PuBLIC PLACES, supra note 2, at 9. 
49. See id. at 151-52. 
50. See ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PuBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PuBLIC ORDER 
32-33 (1971) [hereinafter RELATIONS IN PuBLIC]. 
51. Id. at 38. 
52. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). 
53. Id. at 107. 
54. Id. at Il2. 
55. Id. at 107. 
56. Id. at 113. 
57. Id. at Il2. 
58. Id. at Il3. 
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ing the performer with a private space-like a home, a green room, or a 
bathroom-to do certain necessary things away from an audience. 
The legal implication of this theory is to conceive of a right to 
privacy as a right to exclude, which reflects the Lockean origins of the 
argument. Ruth Gavison defined privacy as a limited right of access by 
others to our private spaces.59 While calling for greater social research 
into the area, Alan P. Bates, a sociologist, considered the minimal social 
science literature on privacy and defined the concept as "a person's feel-
ing that others should be excluded from something which is of concern 
to him .... "60 That is, much like the law of trespass, a tort for unautho-
rized encroachments onto another's land, a theory of privacy based on 
space and separation necessarily includes the attendant right to exclude 
others and to determine who should gain entry. And this right to exclude 
reflects the Lockean liberal tradition. Locke believed that we own our-
selves and, therefore, own the fruits of our labor.61 We can exclude 
others from our property,62 and so can a theory of privacy based on 
sequestration and analogized to spaces and territories allow us to 
exclude others from our private sphere. 
Warren and Brandeis understood this when they used Lockean 
ideas of personal ownership to argue that our "inviolate personality" 
mandated legal protection from intrusion by government and private 
actors.63 Warren and Brandeis argued that common law intellectual 
property laws allowed individuals to control the publication of their cul-
tural creations.64 The laws offered protection of profits and the ability to 
prevent publication at al1.65 But the authors felt that this basic concept of 
personal property could not solely be based on the creative or innovative 
aspects of the underlying artifact.66 After all, one could have a collection 
of coins that he would like to keep private, and it would be unjust to 
allow another to publish a catalogue of those coins even though the 
59. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,446-47 (1980); see 
also BOK, supra note 37, at 10; Ernest Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 149, 
149 (1. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971); Sidney M. Jourard, Some Psychological 
Aspects of Privacy, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 307, 307 (1966); O'BRIEN, supra note 35, at 16; 
Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34, 35-36 (1967). 
60. Alan P. Bates, Privacy-A Useful Concept?, 42 Soc. FORCES 429, 429 (1964). 
61. See LOCKE, supra note 31, §§ 25-27. Locke argued that there existed in nature a 
"commons" to which no one person held ownership. [d. This included lakes, streams, animals, and 
anything else created naturally or by God. ld. But Locke also believed that "every man has 
property in his own person." ld. § 27. Therefore, if man owns himself, whenever he "mixe[s] his 
labour with" something in the commons, it becomes his property. ld. 
62. See id. § 123. 
63. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 205. 
64. ld. at 200. 
65. ld. 
66. See id. at 202-03. 
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coins could not be considered intellectual property in any sense.67 
Rather, the "protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, 
expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, ... is merely an 
instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to 
be let alone" based on the Lockean principle that we own ourselves.68 
The same principle animated Jeffrey Reiman's view that privacy "con-
fer[s] title to [one's] existence" and allows us to claim ownership over 
our thoughts and actions because the private world is entirely our own.69 
Similarly, Larry Lessig's conception of privacy-as-property is based on 
the same notions of separation and Lockean personal ownership.70 
But although they retain fidelity to individual rights, principles of 
separation and exclusion do more harm than good.71 The attendant spa-
tial analogy has become so pervasive in law that, at times, it has limited 
personal privacy. It used to be the case that violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, which guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures at the hands of the government, depended upon a physical inva-
sion of a private place, like a home.72 In Olmstead v. United States, for 
example, the Supreme Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to 
a warrantless wiretap because the tap, by virtue of the fact that it was 
installed on the outdoor phone line and did not require entry into the 
suspect's home, could not constitute a search: "There was no searching. 
There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense 
of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of 
the defendants."73 Where there was no entry, or no intrusion into the 
private space, there was no search.14 Although Olmstead has been over-
67. See id. at 203. 
68. [d. at 205. 
69. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS 
OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 300, 309-14 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984). 
70. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Privacy as Property, 69 Soc. REs. 247 (2002) (arguing that 
using the rhetoric of property and ownership along with the moral rights associated with it to 
understand and argue for privacy would enhance privacy protections). 
71. For a powerful critique of Professor Lessig's notion of privacy as property, see DIGITAL 
PERSON, supra note 24. "When personal information is understood as a property right, the value of 
privacy often is translated into the combined monetary value of particular pieces of personal 
information. Privacy becomes the right to profit from one's personal data, and the harm to privacy 
becomes understood as not being adequately paid for the use of this 'property.'" [d. at 88-89. 
Professor Solove goes on at some length to discuss the difficulties with this theory. See id. at 
89-90. 
72. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463-64 (1928). 
73. [d. at 464. 
74. See id. Justice Brandeis, of course, famously dissented, arguing that the right to be let 
alone that he and Samuel Warren discussed decades earlier meant that a physical invasion was not 
required for an act of intrusion to constitute a privacy violation. [d. at 478 (Brandeis, I., 
dissenting). 
The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in scope. The 
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turned,75 the idea of private spaces that animated Olmstead still threatens 
to limit privacy protections.76 And as Katrin Byford has noted, a spatial 
theory of privacy will undermine privacy online, where physical spaces, 
as such, do not exist: "A territorial view of privacy, which associates the 
concept of privacy with the sanctity of certain physical spaces, has no 
application in a realm in which there is no space."77 This not only has 
the effect of erasing privacy from the virtual world, but also, as Profes-
sor Mary Anne Franks has argued, it implies that Internet life, and any 
injuries that occur in it, are less real and less worthy of protection or 
redress.78 
More broadly, conceiving of privacy as detachment or separation 
and using a spatial analogy to make sense of it has logical limitations. It 
ignores the fact that people can find privacy in public places. What's 
more, it tells us little more than the mere fact that there are private 
places and public places and, therefore, cannot describe the contours of 
those spaces. We are left with either no clear path to understand privacy 
or one so bold and absolute that we start treating invasions of privacy 
like trespasses onto land. Professor Lessig argues that privacy-as-prop-
erty can function with limitations,79 but it is not clear how locating the 
shibboleth of privacy in separation and exclusion could accept any of 
those limits with any intellectual honesty. 
Id. 
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit 
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his 
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They 
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. 
75. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
76. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,40-41 (1988) (finding no privacy interest 
in garbage when placed outside a recognized private space: after all, if we "deposit[ ] ... garbage 
'in an area particularly suited for public inspection and . . . public consumption, for the express 
purpose of having strangers take it,'" we cannot reasonably expect to maintain privacy in that 
discarded trash). See also Kerr, supra note 8, at 809-15 (offering a descriptive argument that 
property principles remain active in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
77. Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for the 
Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 40 (1998) 
(quoted in Solove, supra note 14, at 1131-32). 
78. See Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 
20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224, 226 (2011) ("[H]arms committed in cyberspace are often 
dismissed as 'not really real,' as they are by their nature not physical, bodily harms."). Professor 
Franks has called this phenomenon "cyberspace idealism." Id.; see also Waldman, supra note 31, 
at 359-60. 
79. See Lessig, supra note 70, at 256-57. 
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2. INTIMACY, SECRECY, AND DEVIANCE 
If a theory of privacy based on separation, exclusion, and self-own-
ership seems too rigid and unrealistic, some privacy scholars avoid the 
spatial analogy and its attendant difficulties by looking to what things 
are private, not where they are kept. Private things, like secrets, can go 
anywhere and retain their private nature. Conceiving of privacy this way 
also comports with the common understanding that intimate informa-
tion-sexuality, medical diagnoses, personal histories-are central to 
what we consider private. But while these theories retain the Lockean 
and Kantian presumption of individual inviolability and are reflected in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, they too narrowly circumscribe privacy 
and are often burdened by normative judgments about concealed 
information. 
Much of the literature on privacy centers on intimacy even when it 
overlaps with theories of separation and exclusion. For example, to 
explain his theory of public versus private, Howard White offered exam-
ples of privacy intrusions to which he expected we could all relate: a 
question about a military cadet's sexual orientation,80 an inquiry into 
why parents only had one child, and questions from the Kinsey 
Reports.8! The historian Georges Duby called private things "precious," 
which "concern nobody else."82 Robert Gerstein and Jeffrey Rosen both 
argued that intimate relationships need privacy to function and flour-
ish.83 And despite the fact that they both concluded that individual pri-
vacy includes some measure of control over information dissemination, 
Jean Cohen's and Julie Inness's conceptions of privacy are bound up 
with intimacy. To Professor Cohen, privacy is about choice, but the 
choice is about "whether, when, and with whom one will discuss inti-
mate matters."84 For Professor Inness, privacy is the "state of the agent 
80. White, supra note 29, at 180-81. Before its final repeal in 2010, the armed services' so-
called "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy banned gay service members from serving openly and 
admitting their sexual orientation. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006), repealed by Don't Ask, Don't Tell 
Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515-16. Professor White would still consider 
the question of sexuality to be an intrusion into the private sphere regardless of the law. 
81. White, supra note 29, at 180-81. The Kinsey Reports are two books on human sexual 
behavior: ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948), and 
ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953). See Data from 
Alfred Kinsey's Studies, KINSEY lNST., http://www.kinseyinstitute.org/researchlak-data.htrnl (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2015). The research included thousands of interviews and questions about sex, 
sexual practices, and physical desires. Id. 
82. Georges Duby, Forward to A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE viii (Philippe Aries et al. eds., 
Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1987). 
83. Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPIDCAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIvACY 
265 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE 
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8 (2000). 
84. Jean L. Cohen, The Necessity of Privacy, 68 Soc. REs. 318, 319 (2001) (emphasis added). 
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having control over [the] realm of intimacy, which contains her deci-
sions about intimate access to herself . . . and her decisions about her 
own intimate actions."85 In other words, what links all areas to privacy is 
the common denominator of intimacy, which draws its value from an 
individual's sense of love, caring, and liking.86 To these scholars, inti-
macy is the "chief restricting concept" in the definition of privacy.S7 
Intimacy also reflects the same Lockean and Kantian concepts of 
personal inviolability as other theories of privacy. If, according to 
Locke, we own ourselves, then the pieces of ourselves we keep closest 
to our hearts-namely, intimate details-are at the core of what society 
is meant to protect. Similarly, we could analogize intimate information 
to that which defines us in Kant's purely rational and autonomous realm; 
if our inclinations, wants, and desires make us all fungible subjects in 
the physical world, it is the world of pure autonomy that defines who we 
are as individuals. The same could be said of intimate information, thus 
elevating intimacy to the forefront of a right to privacy protected by 
society. 
One advantage of privacy-as-intimacy is that, as Dan Solove 
argued, the concept is already reflected in public law and in several 
Supreme Court decisions on due process, ranging as far back as 1923.88 
For example, the Family Educational Privacy Act protects information 
about students,89 the Right to Financial Privacy Act guarantees secrecy 
over certain financial. holdings,90 the Video Privacy Protection Act 
guards our video rental history,91 and the Health Insurance Portability 
85. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIvACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56 (1992). 
86. [d. at 56, 78; see also Solove, supra note 14, at 1121-22. 
87. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 263 (1977). 
88. Though the Court never mentioned the word "privacy," its decisions in Meyer v. 
Nebraska, which struck down a law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in elementary 
schools, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which struck down a law requiring that all children attend 
public schools, suggest that there was something special, or intimate, about the parent-child 
relationship and the family unit. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400-03 (1923); Pierce v. 
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.s. 510, 534-35 (1925). Both laws at issue in Meyer and Pierce intruded 
into the parents' process of raising their children as they saw fit. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01; 
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. The Court made the connection between these cases and privacy 
jurisprudence in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
89. 20 U.S.c. § 1232g(b)(1) (2012) ("No funds shall be made available under any applicable 
program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the 
release of education records or personally identifiable information contained therein .... "). 
90. 12 U.S.c. §§ 3402-03 (2012) ("No financial institution, or officer, employees, or agent of 
a financial institution, may provide to any Government authority access to or copies of, or the 
information contained in, the financial records of any customer except in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter."). 
91. 18 U.S.c. § 271O(b)(I) (2012) ("A video tape service provider who knowingly discloses, 
to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider shall 
be liable to the aggrieved person .... "). This law was passed in reaction to the video rental history 
of Judge Robert Bork and his wife being publicized during his ultimately unsuccessful Supreme 
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and Accountability Act provides some security for our health data.92 
Furthermore, cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and even 
Lawrence v. Texas reflect the Court's concern for the protection of inti-
macy, whether through a constitutional right to privacy or a more gen-
eral principle of liberty.93 Griswold used the penumbras of several 
guarantees in the Constitution to argue that a right to privacy protected a 
married woman's access to contraception.94 Justice Douglas concluded 
his opinion by connecting the intimacy of the marital union with the 
right to privacy: 
We deal with a right of privacy [in marriage] .... Marriage is a 
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and inti-
mate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes 
a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a 
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an asso-
ciation for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions.95 
In Roe, the Court enshrined a woman's right to decide to terminate a 
pregnancy on similar privacy grounds.96 And in Lawrence, the Court 
struck down a state anti-sodomy law on the ground that gay persons, like 
all others, enjoy a liberty interest in intimate association: "When sexual-
Court confirmation hearings. See Video Privacy Protection Act, ELECTRONIC Pruv ACY INFO. 
CENTER, https:/Iepic.orglprivacy/vppa! (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
92. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-6, d-9 (2012) ("A person who knowingly ... (I) uses or causes 
to be used a unique health identifier; (2) obtains individually identifiable health information ... ; 
or (3) discloses individually identifiable health information to another person, shall be 
punished .... "). 
93. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) ("[T]he case should be resolved by 
determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in ... private conduct in the 
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause .... "); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 
(1973) ("[T]he Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain 
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.s. 
479, 482, 485 (1965) (finding unconstitutional a "law [that] operates directly on an intimate 
relation of husband and wife"). See also Solove, supra note 14, at 1106-07. 
94. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85. 
95. Id. at 486. 
96. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 ("This right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a 
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."). Justice Stewart, concurring, 
recognized 
"the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child." That right necessarily includes the right 
of a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. "Certainly the 
interests of a woman in giving of her physical and emotional self during pregnancy 
and the interests that will be affected throughout her life by the birth and raising of a 
child are of a far greater degree of significance and personal intimacy than the right 
to send a child to private school protected in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, or the right 
to teach a foreign language protected in Meyer v. Nebraska." 
[d. at 169-70 (Stewart, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
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ity finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the 
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more endur-
ing. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual per-
sons the right to make this choice."97 In all three cases, the intimate and 
personal nature of the act in question-contraception and family plan-
ning, birth and pregnancy, and sodomy and sex-was at the center of the 
Court's rhetoric and substance. 
But it is not clear what limits "intimacy." For the Court, intimate 
conduct was something personal, perhaps sexual or familial. Professor 
Inness felt that intimacy includes a heart-felt emotional component;98 to 
Tom Gerety, intimacy was a state of "consciousness" where you have 
access to your own and others' bodies and minds.99 Charles Fried 
defined intimacy as sharing personal information with a select few close 
associates,IOO which is a narrower conception of intimacy than those of 
Professors Inness and Gerety.lOl Therefore, limiting privacy to intimacy, 
variously defined, is unhelpful. 
These conceptualizations have an indeterminacy problem. The soci-
010gist's conception of intimacy, though universally bound up with the 
concept of secrecy, suffers a different problem: it is burdened by norma-
tive judgment. In his seminal article, The Sociology of Secrecy and of 
Secret Societies, Georg Simmel concluded that privacy is a "universal 
sociological form" defined by hiding something. 102 It is universal in that 
we do it all the time. If all relationships between people are based on 
knowing something about each other, then keeping certain facets of our-
selves hidden can define those relationships. This does not necessarily 
mean that the person who knows more about us is more correct in his 
assessment of who we are; rather, different pictures of personae are true 
for different people.103 Secrecy, therefore, allows us to do things and 
maintain relationships we would not otherwise be able to in a world of 
complete knowledge. 
Simmel's theory has one distinct advantage over any conception of 
privacy based on separation and exclusion: his discourse on secret socie-
ties can help us understand when a secret has ceased to be private. Pri-
vacy-as-separation fails in part because it is too strict-privacy can be 
eroded when one other person gains access. For Simmel, a secret can 
maintain its private nature, its inherent secrecy, throughout a group of 
97. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
98. See INNES, supra note 85, at 78-80. 
99. See Gerety, supra note 87, at 268. 
100. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 484 (1968). 
101. See generally Solove, supra note 14, at 1122-24. 
102. Simmel, supra note 3, at 463. 
\03. [d. at 443, 445. 
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people when keeping the secret is part of the identity of that group. 104 
Members of secret societies "constitute a community for the purpose of 
mutual guarantee of secrecy." 105 They define themselves by engaging in 
rituals and through separation from the rest of society. 106 This does not 
just happen in cults; social cliques turn their backs on others or deny 
conversation to outsiders, and groups of friends maintain each other's 
secrets all the time. In all cases, the group is defined by what it knows, 
and it expresses its privileged status by closure. 
The sociologist Diane Vaughan connected this conception of 
secrecy with intimacy in her study of how couples separate, arguing 
"[w]e are all secret-keepers in our intimate relationships."107 Secrets can 
both enhance relationships, by smoothing over differences or by creating 
the intimacy of co-conspirators, and contribute to their collapse, by 
allowing one partner to have a life without open inspection, consent, or 
participation from the other partner. 108 And Erving Goffman would 
agree that this type of secrecy is an important element of privacy: "If an 
individual is to give expression to ideal standards during his perform-
ance," Goffman writes, "then he will have to forgo or conceal action 
which is inconsistent with these standards."109 In this view, privacy is 
the concealment of things that contradict an individual's public fa~ade: 
the "private sacrifice" of some behavior will permit the performance to 
continueYo This is what the backstage is really forYI It is not, as a 
spatial theory of privacy would suggest, a room, stall, or secluded place; 
rather, it is the locus of private behavior, of secrets. For example, ser-
vants use first names, workers laugh and take breaks, and management 
and employees may eat together and converse informally.1l2 In some 
cases, this culture is associated with a space; 113 but it is what we do in 
the backstage, the secrets we hide there, that defines it. 
There are two central failures of understanding privacy as a means 
104. Id. at 445. 
105. Id. at 477. 
106. Id. at 484-85. 
107. DIANE VAUGHAN, UNCOUPLING: TURNING POINTS IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 11 (1986). 
108. See id. at 13. 
109. GOFFMAN, supra note 52, at 41; see also id. at 48. The idea of privacy as based on secrecy 
was echoed by Judge Posner: "[T]he word 'privacy' seems to embrace at least two distinct 
interests ... [including] concealment of information, [which] is invaded whenever private 
information is obtained against the wishes of the person to whom the information pertains." 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE 273-74 (1981). 
110. GOFFMAN, supra note 52, at 44. 
111. See id. at 114. 
112. See id. at 116. 
113. Consider, for example, the British television series, Upstairs-Downstairs, and the PBS 
Masterpiece Classic, Downton Abbey. Both of these series depict the behaviors of servants, who 
live "downstairs," and their aristocratic masters, who live "upstairs." 
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of keeping secrets, however. First, once the secret is out, even to one 
other person, both the secret and its attendant privacy interest are extin-
guished. Dan Solove has called this the "secrecy paradigm" in American 
law and lamented its domination of our approach to privacy, especially 
given the pervasiveness of modem technologies that require us to reveal 
information to third parties. 114 Second, we have a tendency to conceive 
of secrets as discrediting, embarrassing, or, to use the sociologist's term, 
deviant. 115 A tilt toward deviance, in tum, places a severe limitation on 
using secrecy to justify a legal right to privacy: if our secrets are so 
discrediting, society would rarely, if ever, see a need to protect them. 
Much of the sociological discourse on secrecy and intimacy as it 
relates to privacy devolves into a normative moral judgment about those 
secrets. Despite the fact that he professes to make no such judgment,116 
Goffman's view of secret, hidden behaviors, for example, has a decid-
edly negative bias.ll7 The backstage is littered with "dirty work"118 and 
"inappropriate" conduct done in "secret."1l9 From this introduction of 
the backstage, Goffman only further burdens it with a normative twist. 
People "lapse" in the backstage,120 drifting toward indecorous behav-
ior.121 They laugh at their audience, engage in mock role-playing, and 
poke fun through "uncomplimentary terms of reference."122 They dero-
gate others and brazenly lie123 and keep '''dark' secrets."124 Behind 
involvement shields, individuals do "sanctionable" or "unprofessional" 
things, like nurses smoking in a tunnel or adolescent horseplay outside 
114. DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 24, at 42-43, 143. 
115. DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, 
AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 58 (1996). "Deviance refers to behavior that violates the nonns of some 
group." [d.; see also Ball, supra note 38, at 260 ("[D]eviance occurs when one engages in 
activities which are recognized as infractions of collectively held rules or nonns to which are 
attached varied punitive sanctions as social control mechanisms."). 
116. See BEHAVIOR IN PuBLIC PLACES, supra note 2, at 5. 
117. In fact, he echoes Durkheim when he uses the word "profane" seven times to describe 
activities in the private sphere in THE PREsENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LlFE, supra note 52, 
and in BEHAVIOR IN PuBLIC PLACES, supra note 2. Surprisingly, the word was never used in 
STIGMA, supra note 1. For Durkheim, the profane was the opposite of the sacred; it was the 
everyday, the dirty and mundane activities of life that would destroy the sanctity of sacred things 
if they ever touched: "the only way to define the relation between the sacred and profane is their 
heterogeneity ... [which] is absolute." EMILE DURKHElM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS 
LlFE 38 (Carol Cosman trans., 2001). The same could be said for private activities in the backstage 
because if any member of the audience saw what went on beyond the perfonnance (the profane), 
the fa~ade of the perfonnance (the sacred) would be destroyed. 
118. See GOFFMAN, supra note 52, at 44. 
119. [d. at 41. 
120. [d. at 132. 
121. See id. at 108. 
122. [d. at 174. 
123. See id. at 175. 
124. [d. at 141. 
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of the view of others. 125 Goffman also points to the little misbehaviors-
activities he calls "fugitive involvements," no less l26-that you can 
engage in when outside the public view: 
While doing housework: You can keep your face creamed, your hair 
in pin curls; ... when you're sitting at the kitchen counter peeling 
potatoes you can do your ankle exercises and foot strengtheners, and 
also practice good sitting posture .... While reading or watching TV: 
You can brush your hair; massage your gums; do your ankle and 
hand exercises and foot strengtheners; do some bust and back exer-
cises; massage your scalp; use the abrasive treatment for removing 
superfluous hair. 127 
Privacy, then, is about concealing bad things, not just concealment in 
general. The anonymity provided by privacy does not merely allow 
someone to do something different; rather, it allows him to "misbehave," 
to "falsely present[]" himself,128 or to do the "unattractive"129 things 
inappropriate in the public sphere. 
One of Goffman's major works, Stigma, is entirely concerned with 
negative or inappropriate behavior. That may sound like an uninspired 
conclusion given the title, but what is most telling is not the mere recita-
tion of stigmatizing activities and things, but rather the implication that 
the private sphere is defined by stigma. Stigmas are "discrediting,"130 
"debasing,"131 and "undesirable."132 They are "secret failings"133 that 
make us "blameworthy"134 and "shameful."135 This moral judgment per-
vades the legal, philosophical, and social science literature, as well. For 
Alan Bates, privacy does not simply protect against disclosures, but 
rather against "humiliating and damaging" ones about which others 
would "disapprove[ ]."136 The sociologist David Diekema follows in a 
similar vein: privacy shields "improper" behaviors, "transgressions or 
nasty habits."137 And Richard Posner argues that privacy protections 
grant people a right to conceal "legitimately discrediting or deceiving 
125. See BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES, supra note 2, at 39. 
126. [d. at 66. 
127. [d. at 65 (quoting Sam Bellow, Distractions of a Fiction Writer, in NEW WORLD WRITING 
No. 12, 231 (1957». 
128. [d. at 130. 
129. See id. at 66. 
130. STIGMA, supra note 1, at 3. 
131. [d. at 43. 
132. [d. at 3. 
133. [d. at 31. 
134. [d. at 78. 
135. [d. at 140. 
136. Bates, supra note 60, at 433. 
137. David A. Diekema, Aloneness and Social Form, 15 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 481, 487 
(1992). 
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facts."138 It should come as no surprise, then, that several sociologists 
define private spaces as an outlet for deviant, discrediting behavior. 139 
It is hard to deny the moral dimension to this discussion of private 
behaviors, activities, and symbols. They are stigmatizing, at worst, or 
dissonant with normal social interaction, at best. In either case, there is a 
moral dimension that burdens privacy with an attendant profanity; 140 if 
the private sphere is characterized by dark secrets, or behaviors and 
activities that society refuses to tolerate, it is unclear how a right to pri-
vacy could ever exist. 
B. Privacy as Freedom For 
The previous theories of privacy reflected the individual's right to 
seclude himself and exclude others from certain aspects of his life, 
whether intimate, deviant, or not. They appreciated privacy as guaran-
teeing freedom from something: private places and private things were 
so called because they belonged to the individual, who had the power to 
control dissemination. But, as we have discussed, these theories are too 
rigid or too burdened by moral judgment to adequately capture what we 
mean by privacy and justify state protection for a right to privacy. 
Several other theories take the same mantle of individual freedom 
and look forward, viewing privacy as a necessary condition for generat-
ing the ideals of independence and autonomy. The argument that privacy 
protects personhood, or that which constitutes our essence,141 emerges 
directly from Locke's notion of self-ownership and Warren's and Bran-
deis' derivative theory of "inviolate personality."142 Conceiving of pri-
vacy as essential to the concepts of autonomy and free choice also stems 
from liberal theory. But although self-realization and autonomy are 
important values reflected in some Supreme Court jurisprudence, they 
138. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, 2 REGULATION 19, 25 (1978). 
139. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 38, at 261-62; see also id. at 270 (referring to the work of 
sociologist Jon Lofland, who also defined private spaces as providing opportunities for deviance). 
See JON LOFLAND, DEVIANCE AND IDENTITY 68 (1969). 
140. See DURKHEIM, supra note 117, at 36 ("The division of the world into two comprehensive 
domains, one sacred, the other profane, is the hallmark of religious thought."). Durkheim's 
concept of profanity was not limited to curse words. Rather, at least in the context of religion, the 
mundane every day, as distinct from the purity of ritual and religious objects, was profane. See id. 
at 36-38. For Mary Douglas, a leading Durkheimian of the twentieth century, social "dirt" and 
"disorder" are profane. MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF 
POLLUTION AND TABOO 2, 21 (1966). More than any other scholar, Mary Douglas has made 
Durkheim's sacred-profane distinction the cornerstone of her scholarship. 
141. See, e.g., Professor Paul A. Freund, Harvard University, Annual Dinner Address at the 
American Law Institute 52nd Annual Meeting 31 (May 23, 1975), at 43-44; see also Solove, 
supra note 14, at 1116. 
142. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 205. 
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offer no pathway toward a workable theory of privacy. Like other rights-
based conceptions of privacy, they could be limitless and harmful. 
1. INDIVIDUALITY~ INDEPENDENCE, AND PERSONHOOD 
Like Kant, whose metaphysics demanded that individuals be 
treated with dignity rather than as subjects of others, some scholars 
argue that respecting privacy is a necessary element of valuing individu-
als as ends in themselves. Alan Bates channeled Kant when he argued 
that privacy only has meaning in terms of a rational, autonomous self 
that is capable of self-consciousness: "privacy refers to an important 
dimension of [an individual's] distinction between ... that which is 
crucial to self and that which has negligible importance."143 He could 
have been talking about intimate information,l44 but he takes as given 
the fact that we do not accord privacy rights to children. 145 This suggests 
that the crux of privacy is the reasoning and self-awareness that comes 
with maturation and not necessarily the subject matter of any secret. 
Stanley Benn and Edward Bloustein express a similar idea. For Benn, 
individuals resent being watched because it makes them feel like tools in 
someone else's hands and not as free individuals "with sensibilities, 
ends, and aspirations of their own, morally responsible for their own 
decisions, and capable, as mere specimens are not, of reciprocal rela-
tions" with others. 146 Bloustein adds that privacy invasions have effects 
far beyond any physical encroachment or injury: one who is subject to 
intrusions "is less of a man, [and] has less human dignity" precisely 
because his privacy, a manifestation of his free self, is at risk. 147 This 
view evokes both Kant's mandate to treat everyone as ends in them-
selves and Locke's notions of self-ownership and his explanation for 
creating government out of the state of nature. In both cases, the lack of 
individual rights and protection for the person's life, liberty, and prop-
erty does violence to his sense of self and his entitlements as a free, 
autonomous person. 
One of those entitlements is the protection of individuality and free 
thought, and many scholars argue that privacy plays an essential role in 
making such independence possible. Alan Bates, for example, believed 
that privacy allowed individuals to process information before speak-
143. Bates, supra note 60, at 432. 
144. See supra Part II.A.2. 
145. See Bates, supra note 60, at 431. 
146. Stanley I. Benn, Privacy. Freedom. and Respectfor Persons, in NOMOS Xill: PRIVACY 1, 
6 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971); see also Solove, supra note 14, at 
1116-17. 
147. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 973-74 (1964). 
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ing,148 and the philosophers Mark Alfino and Randolph Mayes argue 
that a person requires privacy in order to reason about his choices. 149 
That intellectual space both defines the individual and would be dam-
aged by any interference from the state or society. 
A close corollary to this conception of privacy is the notion that 
privacy provides us the space necessary to craft and edit ideas before 
public consumption. 150 This idea, what Julie Cohen refers to as "intellec-
tual privacy," combines interests in personal autonomy and private 
spaces. lSI It offers us the freedom to "explore areas of intellectual inter-
est" that we might not feel comfortable discussing around other peo-
ple,152 including unpopular ideas, deviant ones, or, more importantly, 
incomplete ones. It is, therefore, an essential part of our rights of self-
determination. 153 
The primary advantages of this theory of privacy and personhood 
are its rhetorical strength and its ability to move beyond the limited 
vision of privacy inspired by detachment and intimacy. If privacy is 
essential to who we are as free selves, then a right to privacy need not 
wait for a physical intrusion into a private space or a revelation of a 
stigmatizing private fact. Surveillance, for example, can cause two addi-
tional types of injuries. First, as the philosopher George Kateb has 
argued, simply being watched could constitute an injury because it 
demeans you as a person. 154 As a subject of surveillance, you are 
stripped of your entitlement to freedom as a self-aware individual in a 
free society; you are "oppress[ed]," "degrad[ed]," and made the subject 
of others. 155 Stanley Benn explains that you begin to see yourself in a 
new light, "as something seen through another's eyes," which "dis-
rupt[s], distort[s], or frustrate[s]" your ability to think and act on your 
own.156 Second, Jeffrey Rosen implied in The Unwanted Gaze that being 
watched, being under surveillance, and studied can lead to discrimina-
148. Bates, supra note 60, at 432. 
149. Mark Alfino & G. Randolph Mayes, Reconstructing the Right to Privacy, 29 Soc. 
THEORY & ?RAc. I, 8 (2003). 
150. Ruth Gavison notes that privacy gives us the opportunity to express unpopular ideas first 
to sympathetic audiences and, then, "[a]fter a period of germination, [we] may be more willing to 
declare [our] unpopular views in public." Gavison, supra note 59, at 450. 
151. Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575,576-77 (2003). 
152. [d. at 579. 
153. [d. at 577. 
154. George Kateb, On Being Watched and Known, 68 Soc. RES. 269, 274-75 (2001). 
155. [d. at 275. 
156. Benn, supra note 146, at 7, 26. Channeling Locke and Kant, Professor Kateb argues that 
privacy allows us to truly own ourselves and treat ourselves as autonomous and "inviolable." 
Kateb, supra note 154, at 277-78. 
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tion. 157 For Rosen, "[pJrivacy protects us from being misdefined and 
judged out of context in a world ... in which information can easily be 
confused with knowledge."158 Data aggregators used by private compa-
nies and government agencies can take incomplete or inaccurate infor-
mation about us and categorize us in ways that limit our opportunities. 
Sometimes this is relatively innocuous, like when Google misuses the 
information in an Orthodox Jew's emails to awkwardly suggest a banner 
advertisement for ChristianMingle.com. In other cases, it can be devas-
tating: a health care company, for example, denied coverage to an indi-
vidual applicant when it found antidepressants in her prescription history 
and assumed (incorrectly) that she had a severe neurological disorder. 159 
Dan Solove has pointed out that this rich concept of personhood is 
already reflected in long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence on pri-
vacy and liberty.16o In 1891, the Court held that a party in a civil case 
could not be compelled to submit to a medical examination because man 
has the right "to the possession and control of his own person, free from 
all restraint or interference."161 Later, when the Court had occasion to 
rule on a woman's right to choose, it explained the importance of deci-
sions like contraception, family planning, sex, and terminating a preg-
nancy: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under compulsion of the State."162 Granted, activities 
we could consider "intimate" were at the center of these cases; but the 
freedom to make those decisions is about more than their sexual nature. 
Rather, the Court seemed to suggest that these decisions define what it 
means to be treated with dignity as an autonomous individual in a demo-
cratic society.163 
This theory of privacy seems to inspire the most lyricism and 
poetry from scholars and the courts, but it also appears completely 
157. See ROSEN, supra note 83, at 7-9 (discussing how others are likely to misjudge and 
stereotype when personal information is revealed out of context via new technologies). 
158. Id. at 8. 
159. See Chad Terhune, They Know What's in Your Medicine Cabinet, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 22, 2008), http://www.businessweek.comlstories/2008-07-22/they-know-
whats-in-your-medicine-cabinet. 
160. See Solove, supra note 14, at 1117 ("The Supreme Court has espoused a personhood 
theory of privacy in its substantive: due process decisions such as Gri~old v. Connecticut, 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v. Wade, and others. As early as 1891, the Court articulated this 
conce'ption in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford.") (footnotes omitted). 
161. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
162. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
163. See id. ("These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
2015] PRNACY AS TRUST 585 
boundless. Professors Benn, Bloustein, Kateb, and others never explain 
what they mean by "personhood" other than by reference to amorphous 
philosophical concepts. Nor do they attempt to move beyond using the 
theory to explain why we should value privacy to how to use those val-
ues in the courts. Therefore, it cannot help judges articulate a workable 
solution to practical questions of privacy law. 
2. AUTONOMY, CHOICE, AND CONTROL 
Existing alongside all of these theories of privacy are the concepts 
of autonomy and choice: the choice to disseminate information or the 
choice to marry a same-sex partner, for example, and the correlative 
right to control what others know about us. Seen in this way, privacy is 
about the freely choosing self, exercising his liberty in a democratic 
society. But like other theories of privacy, privacy-as-choice or control 
either threatens too broad a reach, providing judges with no adjudicative 
path and pushing scholars toward intellectual confusion, or actually 
injures personal privacy. 
Autonomy and choice are central to both Locke and Kant, as both 
agree that the freedom to choose defines man. Locke sees the state as a 
servant of individual rights because man, while in a state of pure equal-
ity in the state of nature, chooses to join together in government. 164 For 
Kant, autonomy and choice are part of man's transcendental rational 
nature: true freedom is only possible in an intelligible realm detached 
from the things that hold us back as humans. 165 Neo-Kantian liberalism 
takes the freedom embodied by pure rationality in the intelligible realm 
and argues that freedom is the right to choose one's own ends free from 
state interference. 166 
This choosing self is evident in the conventional understanding of 
privacy as the individual's right to choose what the public will know 
about him. Jean Cohen argues that privacy is the right "to choose 
whether, when, and with whom" to share intimate information. 167 
Charles Fried suggests that different groups of friends exist because we 
actively choose to share more with intimate friends ai, i less with 
acquaintances. 168 This free choice gives us the right to control public 
164. See LOCKE, supra note 31, § 123, at 66. 
165. See KANT, supra note 31, at 71-72. 
166. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 561 (1971) ("[A] moral person is a subject with 
ends he has chosen, and his fundamental preference is for conditions that enable him to frame a 
mode of life that expresses his nature as a free and equal rational being as fully as circumstances 
permit.") (emphasis added); see also generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 
(1974) (arguing for a "minimal state"); SANDEL, supra note 31, at 177. 
167. Cohen, supra note 84, at 319. 
168. Fried, supra note 100, at 484. 
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knowledge of our personal selves. Privacy, then, "is the claim of individ-
uals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and 
to what extent information about them is communicated to others."169 It 
is, to Julie Inness, the idea that an individual has "control over a realm of 
intimacy"170 and, to Jonathan Zittrain, control over our information, in 
general. 171 For the philosopher Steve Matthews, exercising privacy is 
making the choice to "control" and "manage" the boundary between 
ourselves and others. I72 The common denominator in all these descrip-
tions is free choice and control, both of which are central to the rights 
ideal. 
In his compelling text, The Digital Person, Dan Solove argued that 
the salient problem with private intermediaries and governments amass-
ing digital dossiers about citizens is the loss of individual control over 
personal information. 173 Collecting data that are already available or 
required for doing business, Solove argues, does not injure personal pri-
vacy in the conventional sense; that is, there is no "discrete wrong" that 
occurs through the behavior of some "particular wrongdoer" who, say, 
discloses personal information to the media.174 Rather, the problem is 
structural. Data are collected without sufficient controls, so Solove rec-
ommends a new architecture of data collection that "affords people 
greater participation in the uses of their information." 175 He recommends 
starting at the Fair Information Practices, a series of recommendations 
from the Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare in 1973 that 
are predominantly focused on ensuring individuals have control over 
their personal data. 176 The guidelines include no secret recordkeeping, a 
pathway for individuals to read their records, a way for individuals to 
prevent their information from being used in different ways, and a 
method of correction and amendment.177 At their core, these recommen-
dations aim at shifting control over data from the collector (an interme-
diary or a government agency) back to the source of that information 
(the individual). Professor Solove's innovative proposals have revolu-
169. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
170. INNESS, supra note 85, at 56. 
171. See Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property 
and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privica,tion, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2000) ("In my view, 
there is a profound relationship between those who wish to protect intellectual property and those 
who wish to protect privacy."). 
172. Steve Matthews, Anonymity and the Social Self, 47 AM. PHIL. Q. 351, 351 (2010). 
173. DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 24, at 90. 
174. See id. at 94. 
175. [d. at 102-03. 
176. See id. at 104. 
177. Id. at 104. Professor Solove also recommends opt-in clauses, rather than opt-out clauses, 
which also increases individual control over data dissemination. Id. at 105-06. 
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tionized our discussion of digital dossiers. For now, it seems clear that 
his theory is based on a conception of privacy that, at least in part, 
assumes that individual control over personal information is a part of a 
just privacy regime. 
This, however, is a problematic way of understanding information 
privacy for three reasons. First, it can be too broad. If privacy is all 
about choice, its exercise becomes entirely subjective, limited only by an 
individual's personal choice of what to reveal and when. A rule based on 
this theory would leave everything up to the individual and offer society 
no opportunity to value other concerns over personal privacy. This is not 
only unworkable, but also dangerous: online harassers who target their 
victims behind a veil of pseudonymity are choosing not to disseminate 
their identities. It is difficult to see how a theory of privacy based on 
choice alone could honestly argue against an absolute right for them to 
remain pseudonymous. 
Second, this conception of privacy may undermine itself. Privacy 
as choice, control, or management over what others know damages pri-
vacy rights because it turns all revelation into a conscious volitional act. 
Courts have run with that presumption and have concluded that individ-
uals assume the risk that any disclosures to third parties could result in 
wider disclosure to others or the government, thus extinguishing privacy 
interests in all previously revealed information. A telephone user, for 
example, "voluntarily convey[s] numerical information to the telephone 
company ... [and] assume[s] the risk" that the telephone company 
would subsequently reveal that information.17s A bank depositor has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the financial information freely 
given to banks because "[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his 
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person 
to the Government."179 And this doctrine has been extended to the 
Internet. Several federal courts have held that because any information 
conveyed to an online service provider in order to access the Internet is 
"knowingly revealed," there could be no invasion of privacy when an 
Internet service provider ("ISP") gives that information to someone 
else. ISO Therefore, although the ideals of autonomy and free choice 
appear to empower the individual with all powers of disclosure, it logi-
cally leads to an evisceration of personal privacy rights. 
178. Smith v. Maryland, 442 u.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
179. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
180. United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508-09 (W.D. Va. 1999); see also United 
States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, lllO (D. Kan. 2000) ("When defendant entered into an 
agreement with Road Runner for Internet service, he knowingly revealed all information 
connected to [his] IP address .... He cannot now claim to have a Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest in his subscriber information."). 
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Third, it is not at all clear that greater individual control over per-
sonal information would create a better, more just regime. Even Profes-
sor Solove, whose recommendations for creating a more just privacy 
regime are, in part, dedicated to giving greater control to individuals, 
admits that control will not always do much good: "people routinely 
give out their personal information for shopping discount cards, for 
access to websites, and even for free," he concedes. 181 Citing Julie 
Cohen, Solove notes that individuals are incapable of exercising ade-
quate control over each individual piece of information because they 
cannot comprehend the enormity of the value of the sum of those 
pieces. 182 Therefore, a privacy regime based on control over our data 
runs up against a brick wall. 
C. Moving Away from Rights 
I have argued that the conventional theories of privacy are based on 
notions of personal inviolability and individual rights, which means that 
the goal of state or judicial intervention has been, traditionally, to protect 
those rights. I have also critiqued these theories as either limitless or 
inelastic or, counter intuitively, damaging to personal privacy interests. 
What's more, even though there is a significant difference between see-
ing privacy as a negative or positive right, both views fall back on the 
same assumptions: the public-private distinction and the individual as 
the locus of the purposes of privacy. This feedback loop might explain 
why scholars are all over the place when discussing privacy. They use 
the rhetoric of autonomy when arguing for privacy-as-separation;183 they 
see privacy as controlling dissemination of information, but seem to 
think of the information being disclosed as necessarily intimate; 184 and 
they talk of personhood and choice when considering deviance and 
secrecy.18S The end result is the same: privacy law has been predomi-
nantly focused on protecting an individual right to control dissemination 
of information and to be able to separate from the public. 
Perhaps these individual-based concepts of privacy are simply 
incomplete; their problematic implications may just be missing pieces in 
a larger puzzle. If so, we have two options. We could give up on privacy 
or we could recognize that the rhetoric and substance of rights only gets 
181. DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 24, at 87. 
182. Id. at 87-88 (citing Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the 
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1397 (2000)). 
183. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 83, at 15-21. 
184. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 84, at 319. 
185. Another explanation is that there is quite a bit of overlap among the various conceptions 
of privacy. This, of course, is true. But I argue that the overlap exists because all of the 
conventional conceptions of privacy are based on the same liberal ideal and liberal assumptions. 
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us so far. 186 Several leading thinkers have taken the first route. Richard 
Posner finds it incongruous for the state to rightly pass laws preventing 
sellers from making false or incomplete representations about their 
goods but to allow an individual to lie or conceal facts to give himself a 
personal advantage. ls7 Amitai Etzioni thinks that our obsession with pri-
vacy is endangering public health and safety, preventing us from pro-
tecting sexual abuse victims and from keeping children healthy and 
privileging criminality over the common good. ISS And Catherine Mac-
Kinnon argues that privacy laws codify the liberal principle of non-inter-
ference, which has the attendant effect of enforcing the hierarchical 
sexual status quo in the unregulated sphere. ls9 Privacy, then, allows men 
to get away with abuse. 190 
Stringent rights-based privacy protections can indeed lead to worri-
some, perhaps unintended negative effects, as Professors Etzioni, Mac-
Kinnon, and many others have suggested. But we need not give up on 
privacy. A second approach would recognize that privacy has value and 
try to rescue the concept from indeterminacy, inelasticity, and whim. 
This was Helen Nissenbaum's goal in her groundbreaking work on pri-
vacy as "contextual integrity."191 Like me, Professor Nissenbaum finds 
conventional understandings of privacy incapable of explaining why cer-
tain modem technological developments strike us as invasive. l92 She 
identified three principles that have governed much of privacy law to 
date-protecting individuals from intrusive government agents, restrict-
ing access to intimate information, and curtailing intrusions into private 
spaces l93-but found them unhelpful when it came to the "grey areas" 
posed by vexing legal questions. 194 Professor Nissenbaum took a 
ground-up approach and identified the social science concepts of appro-
priateness and information flow as the factors that, when breached, 
186. I made a similar argument about the rhetoric and substance of rights in Ari Ezra 
Waldman, Marriage Rights and the Good Life: A Sociological Theory of Marriage and 
Constitutional Law, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 739 (2013) (arguing that although the dominant arguments 
in favor of ending marriage discrimination against same-sex couples have been based on liberal 
toleration, a sociological understanding of the benefits of inclusive marriage is what will 
overcome constitutional hurdles posed by Equal Protection Clause analysis). 
187. Richard Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 399 (1978). 
188. AMITAI ETZlONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 4,7-8 (1999). 
189. See MACKINNON, supra note 13, at 35-36, 89-90, 193-94. 
190. See id. at 168, 193. 
191. See generally Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 18 (positing a new 
construct, "contextual integrity," as an alternative approach to privacy that better addresses the 
challenges posed by new information technologies). 
192. Id. at 119. 
193. Id. at 125. 
194. Id. at 131-33. 
590 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:559 
determine our unease about privacy invasions. 195 
This was also Dan Solove's project in Conceptualizing Privacy. In 
short, Professor Solove wanted the legal academy to take a pragmatic 
approach and remain open to the revolutionary concept that privacy may 
not be reducible to one common denominator. 196 In this context, prag-
matism alludes to Professor Solove's preference for a bottom-up, con-
text-based study of privacy that learns from specific examples of 
intrusions into privacy rather than a top-down, universalist approach. 197 
He asks us to "act [like] cartographers, mapping out the terrain of pri-
vacy by examining specific problematic situations,"198 and takes the 
pragmatist John Dewey's advice to begin philosophical inquiry with 
experience, not abstract principles. 199 Professor Solove would like us to 
be sociologists,200 and I would like to take his advice. 
m. PRIVACY-As-TRusT 
I would like to show how privacy, particularly in the information-
sharing context, is really a social construct based on trust between social 
sharers, between individuals and Internet intermediaries, between groups 
of people interacting online and offline-broadly understood. Trust can 
be narrow, focused solely on confidentiality or security within networks. 
But such formulations sell trust short. Trust is broader: it is a social 
norm of interactional propriety based on the favorable expectations of 
others behavior. It is this conception of trust that animates our current 
195. [d. at 138. 
196. See Solove, supra note 14, at 1099. Solove contrasts the traditional approach to 
conceptualizing privacy with the Wittgensteinian "family resemblance" approach. See id. at 
1095-99. While the former is a "quest for a common denominator ... [that] leads to greater 
clarity," the latter "shows us that such a quest can sometimes lead to greater confusion." [d. at 
1099. In A Taxonomy of Privacy, Solove reiterates his conclusion that "privacy is best understood 
as a family resemblance concept," in which various kinds of privacy disruptions are different but 
share some important and overlapping attributes. See Solove, supra note 26, at 485-86. 
197. See Solove, supra note 14, at 1126-29. 
198. [d. at 1126. 
199. See id. at 1127. 
200. The branch of pragmatism to which Professor Solove refers resembles a subset of 
sociology known as phenomenology. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose famous Phenomenology of 
Perception rejected the Kantian ideal that truth can only be ascertained through complete 
detachment from everyday life, argued that the only way to comprehend reality is through 
experience of the self, the only physical and observable means we have. MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (Colin Smith trans., 1962). Real experiences mediate 
our conceptions of the world around us; without them, the world is meaningless to us: 'The world 
is not an object such that I have in my possession the law of its making," Merlau-Ponty wrote; 
rather, "it is the natural setting of, and field for, all my thoughts and all my explicit 
perceptions .... [T]here is no inner man, man is the world, and only in the world does he know 
himself." [d. at xi-xii. In other words, meaning arises from interactions with the world; meaning 
is, therefore, experiential. 
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and future sharing and disclosing behavior. Therefore, privacy law-the 
collective judicial decisions, legislative enactments, and supporting pol-
icy arguments regulating disclosures, searches and seizures, data aggre-
gation, and other aspects of informational knowledge about us-should 
be focused on protecting relationships of trust. This Section begins by 
assessing several attempts to develop social theories of privacy, all of 
which represent significant steps forward. I then make a theoretical and 
intuitive argument connecting privacy and trust and discuss in detail 
what I mean by trust. I proceed to the next Section with a set of factors 
for evaluating whether trust exists in a given situation of disclosure, 
thereby providing judges and policymakers with a guide for solving 
modem privacy problems, particularly the problem of determining when 
individuals retain privacy rights in previously disclosed information. 
This analysis gives rise to a proposal: a robust tort for breach of 
confidentiality. 
A. Social Theories of Privacy 
To speak of a sociological theory of privacy seems counterintuitive. 
Social things are "collective representations that express collective reali-
ties."201 Whereas social life involves assembled groups and is a manifes-
tation of collective thought, privacy law's traditional focus has been the 
individual. But privacy involves our relationship to society, not our 
departure from it. There has been a smattering of attempts to craft social 
theories of privacy, but although they all share the goal of filling the 
gaps left by the rights-based understandings of privacy discussed 
above,2°2 they remain either incomplete or subject to fatal criticism. I 
will discuss four here. The first model is what I will call a pure relation-
ship model, where privacy is determined based solely on the relation-
ship, or lack thereof, between an individual and someone with access to 
his or her personal information: something is public when it is known by 
those, like strangers, presumably, with whom we have no special rela-
tionship, but private when it is only known to intimates. The relationship 
model explains privacy within defined special relationships like fiduci-
ary and trustee, attorney and client, or doctor and her patient. The phi-
losopher James Rachels, who defined privacy as a right of control and 
access, nevertheless saw relationships as essential; in fact, our ability to 
"maintain different sorts of social relationships with different people" 
was the central goal of privacy.203 For Rachels, public and private exist 
201. DURKHEIM, supra note 117, at 11. 
202. See supra Part TI. 
203. James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 
292 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984). 
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on a scale parallel to a continuum of relationship closeness: intimates are 
such because they know personal information about us, whereas stran-
gers do not. The private world, then, is an intimate world of friends, 
lovers, spouses, and close colleagues. 
This relationship model is distinctly social: its interpretive tool-
the relationship between us and others-lies beyond the individual and 
ignores the substance of the information. In this way, it does not face the 
absolutist and normative critiques plaguing conceptualizations of pri-
vacy based on autonomy and choice, respectively. It also may rescue us 
from the erosion of privacy wrought by Dan Solove's secrecy paradigm 
because its relationship-oriented approach presupposes that information 
can be shared with others-family, friends, and intimates-and still be 
considered private. But it nevertheless fails as a governing understand-
ing of information privacy for several reasons. First, by focusing exclu-
sively on relationships, the model makes information irrelevant. But that 
cannot be the case. Individuals may not be inclined to share embarrass-
ing or stigmatizing information with intimates and feel perfectly com-
fortable sharing it with strangers and yet still feel that this information is 
private in some sense.204 Second, the model seems to imply a propor-
tional and linear relationship between closeness and information shared. 
But maintaining different relationships with different types of people, as 
Rachels suggests is embodied in his model, does not necessarily require 
that those closest to us know the most about us. Third, the model falls 
back on the assumption, held by many of the rights-based theories dis-
cussed above, that information shared with strangers cannot ever be pri-
vate. In this way, we have still not escaped the "secrecy paradigm"205 
trap because anything shared with even one stranger is considered public 
under the pure relationship model. 
Edward Tverdek's modified relationship model consciously picks 
up where Rachels left ofpo6 Tverdek acknowledges that the public-pri-
vate divide varies based on an individual's relationships with certain 
others, but tries to take into account the failings of rights-based and pure 
relationship models by allowing for the fact that not all information is 
fungible. For Tverdek, there are two types of personal information: that 
which creates "esteem-based interests" in how we are regarded by others 
and that which creates "an interest in preventing the practical harms" 
that could occur if others knew it.207 Those interests only arise when 
certain types of interaction partners are involved. Tverdek argues that 
204. See id. (stating individuals feel a "sense of privacy"). 
205. See DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 24, at 8. 
206. See generally Edward Tverdek, What Makes Information "Public"?, 22 PuB. AFF. Q., 
Jan. 2008, at 63. 
207. [d. (emphasis omitted). 
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we may prefer to hide a stigmatized sexual fantasy from those closest to 
us, but have few qualms talking about it to a stranger online.20s Further, 
he suggests that we may barely safeguard our Social Security numbers 
around our spouses, but worry what would happen if strangers got their 
hands on them.209 Tverdek's is an improved taxonomy, if only because 
it recognizes that not all information is fungible and responds to 
Rachels' problematic proportional correlation between closeness and 
information. But it cannot be an accurate conceptualization of informa-
tion privacy for several reasons. First, his esteem versus practical dis-
tinction does not fit Rachels' closeness continuum as neatly as he 
suggests. Many people might not be so cavalier about their Social Secur-
ity numbers, and most would arguably guard it around their friends and 
acquaintances, if not their spouses. And esteem-based interests do not 
disappear as intimacy declines, as the son or daughter of a clergyman or 
local politician would understand. Second, there is no place for strangers 
in Tverdek's taxonomy, leaving us once again victimized by Dan 
Solove's secrecy paradigm. Third, both Tverdek's and Rachels' models 
are focused on individual pieces of information, for example, an identifi-
cation number, a stigmatizing illness, a salary. As Frank Pasquale 
recently noted, privacy problems in a networked world extend far 
beyond our concern for the disclosure of discrete bits of data;210 rather, 
it is the aggregation, analysis, and categorization of terabytes of data 
about individuals that any theory of privacy must also address. More 
analog relationship models, then, leave us ill-equipped to handle some of 
the most vexing questions of modem information privacy law. 
Although the relationship models take a step toward a sociological 
theory of privacy, they do so rather tentatively. They focus on relation-
ships and social interaction, but neglect the fact that privacy is a social 
phenomenon not merely because other people exist, but because privacy 
is about the social circumstances in which information flows from one 
party to another. There are two information flow models in the privacy 
literature, both of which bring us closer to filling the gaps left by rights-
based theories and addressing the modem problems of privacy law. 
In an article in the University of Chicago Law Review, Lior 
Strahilevitz suggested that privacy hinges on how information flows 
among our interaction partners.211 Based on ongoing research in social 
network theory, Strahilevitz eschewed the linear and proportional corre-
lations in the relationship models and suggested that the nature of the 
208. [d. at 73-75. 
209. [d. at 75. 
210. See generally PASQUALE, supra note 24. 
211. See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 17. 
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information and with whom it is shared can determine when a piece of 
shared information is so likely to get out of its original circle of recipi-
ents that it cannot be the basis of an invasion of privacy claim when it 
does.212 More specifically, the more "interesting" or unusual, surprising, 
revealing, or novel a piece of information is, the more likely it will be 
disseminated through a network.213 Complex or aggregate information, 
the sum total of pieces of data about a person, is not likely to be known 
outside of close-knit groups and, therefore, highly likely to stay confi-
dential. But, when information is disclosed to a group that includes 
highly connected, socially active individuals who are situated in multiple 
social networks, the information is likely to be disseminated further 
beyond the initial group.214 Therefore, Strahilevitz argues that if every-
one I know, plus several I do not, know something about me, that infor-
mation is likely to move through the network and into other networks. 
That piece of information is public. But if just my friends know a fact, 
"but not any strangers," then I can expect it to remain with its intended 
recipients.21s Combining these factors together, Strahilevitz concludes, 
allows a judge to see whether the information originally disclosed was 
likely to have become "public" regardless of any subsequent disclo-
sure?16 If it was, it cannot be the basis for an invasion of privacy claim. 
This is a dynamic and powerful idea. Privacy scholarship is richer 
for Professor Strahilevitz's sociological contribution. However, the role 
of strangers in the calculus is problematic. Under Strahilevitz's social 
network theory, the mere fact that a recipient of information is a stran-
ger-namely, someone with whom we do not have personal, face-to-
face, offline experience-may exclude the possibility that we can retain 
a privacy interest in that datum. The practical effect of Strahilevitz's 
theory may be replacing a draconian bright-line rule that extinguishes 
privacy rights upon any disclosure with an apparently softer, contextual 
sociology that nevertheless retains a draconian bright-line rule extin-
guishing privacy rights upon certain disclosures regardless of context, 
intent, or the presence of trust. He has, in other words, simply moved the 
line of Dan Solove's secrecy paradigm a little further down the road. 
What's more, applying the theory requires making several arbitrary 
choices that may not reflect the reality of a particular social network. 
What may be an unusual or rich secret to a judge may be rather mundane 
212. See id. 
213. [d. at 972. 
214. [d. at 972-73. 
215. [d. at 974. 
216. [d. at 974-75 ("Courts simply need to ask themselves: was the widespread dissemination 
of this infonnation inevitable, or did the defendant's actions materially affect the extent of 
subsequent disclosure?"). 
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among a different group of people. The social network theory of privacy 
would invite a judge to impose his or her normative interpretations on 
someone else's potentially different social network. This has the unique 
potential to damage marginalized groups with stigmatized identities 
whose network peculiarities might be wildly foreign to a mainstream 
judiciary, a problem Professor Strahilevitz did not discuss. 
Helen Nissenbaum's theory of privacy as contextual integrity also 
focuses on the flow of information among social actors.217 Under this 
theory, privacy is about "context-relative informational norms"218 that 
"govern the flow of personal information in distinct social contexts (e.g., 
education, health care, and politics)."219 In other words, privacy is about 
what is appropriate for different groups to know about us given the 
nature of the information and the context in which it is shared. An inva-
sion of privacy, then, "is a function of several variables, including the 
nature of the situation, or context; the nature of the information in rela-
tion to that context; the roles of agents receiving information; their rela-
tionships to information subjects; on what terms the information is 
shared by the subject; and the terms of further dissemination."22o As a 
governing theory of privacy, contextual integrity is far superior to the 
rights-based theories discussed above and the nascent social theories of 
Rachels and Tverdek. Professor Nissenbaum's work retains the core pre-
sumption of a social theory-that privacy must account for information 
exchange among social actors-and eschews problematic reliance on 
relationship categories that could arbitrarily limit our privacy interests. 
Although Nissenbaum's work is the latest and most profound attempt to 
bring social theory to our understanding of privacy, there remain gaps in 
the theory. Nissenbaum's reliance on the terms of a social interaction 
threatens a formalistic misapplication of the theory: not all social inter-
actions have terms, and including them in a list of contextual factors 
could elevate formal written agreements over other, equally important 
elements. What's more, asking us to analyze the social context of a 
given incident of disclosure neglects to tell us what kind of context we 
should be looking for. Nissenbaum's work, then, begs the question: if 
privacy is determined in context, what is a "private context"? 
B. Breaches of Privacy as Breaches of Trust 
I argue that a private context is a trusting context. But the sociolo-
gist's vision of trust is far broader than the everyday trust we have in our 
217. See generally NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 18. 
218. ld. at 129. 
219. ld. at 3. 
220. Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 18, at 155. 
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families, loved ones, and friends. It is an aggregation of particularized 
faith in others and the predictability of future actions. It exists among 
friends as well as among strangers. Trust reflects a behavioral exchange 
between two people or among several people or groups. As an 
exchange-an implied social deal-trust is expressed whenever there is 
social interaction. And for any interaction that involves sharing some 
piece of information about ourselves, trust and privacy go hand in hand. 
To see how this is the case, consider the following examples 
gleaned from scholars' assessments of what constitute invasions of pri-
vacy. The literature review suggested that breaches of privacy included, 
among other examples, barging into a bathroom; reading a diary; asking 
an intrusive question; revealing someone else's secrets disclosed to you; 
aggregating and analyzing data about someone else, i.e., a consumer, 
into a virtual persona; staring at another person; overhearing a conversa-
tion not meant for you; and governments making documents more avail-
able by placing them online. Let us proceed to analyze each example in 
turn. 
Barging into a bathroom and reading a diary are popular exam-
ples.221 Yet that generally accepted view cannot be based on something 
inherent to a bathroom-the stall's walls or the bathroom door-or a 
diary-its lock or its owner's name embossed on the front cover; other-
wise, privacy would be limited to when we are enclosed by walls or 
within our property boundaries.222 It would also ignore the invasion, 
manifested by a sense of being startled, by someone's mere presence 
where we do not expect. 
Howard White was correct when he suggested that a simple ques-
tion can be an invasion.223 Before the repeal of the military's "Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell" policy, military recruiters were ostensibly prohibited 
from asking an applicant's sexual orientation.224 We find such questions 
invasive even though one person may be proud of his sexual orientation 
and have no qualms about revealing a detail that might seem intimate to 
221. These examples can be analogized to Goffman' s "backstage" in that they are closed off to 
members of the public, i.e., the audience, and in that the activities that take place there are "kept 
hidden from [the audience]." See GOFFMAN, supra note 52, at 112-13. 
222. To be sure, privacy based on property has a long history in American law. See. e.g., 
Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 457, 459-61 (1928) (reviewing precedent that found 
Fourth Amendment violations where the defendant's right to private property was impinged); see 
also id. at 474-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Kerr, supra note 8, at 809-20 (arguing that "a strong 
and underappreciated connection exists between the modern Fourth Amendment and real property 
law"). 
223. See White, supra note 29, at 180. Sixty-three percent of respondents agreed that asking an 
intrusive question could constitute an invasion of privacy. 
224. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. 103-160, § 571, 107 
Stat. 1547, 1670-73 (1993), repealed by Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (codified at 10 U.S.c. § 654 (2012». 
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others. But the crux of the invasion cannot be inherent in the question 
itself because intimacy and privacy are different things for different 
people. 
Revealing secrets is another prototypical invasion of privacy,225 but 
the invasion must be based on more than mere revelation. Spouses can 
reveal their friends' secrets to each other; indeed, there is anecdotal evi-
dence that many people expect that to happen.226 
Some feel that private companies and government agencies that 
aggregate all available information about groups of individuals and cate-
gorize those groups based on that analysis invade personal privacy even 
if that data are never leaked and are never used to any effect.227 But, 
again, there is nothing inherently private, in the conventional sense, 
about that data, which could range from the last book you purchased on 
Amazon to your prescription drug history and which was all given over 
to a third-party intermediary at some point. As Dan Solove has argued, 
analyzing and aggregating information you already disclosed to a third 
party can only be considered an invasion of privacy if our conception of 
privacy is based on strict secrecy.228 
Listening to a conversation between two other people at a party, in 
a restaurant, or an otherwise public place could amount to a privacy 
invasion.229 But if the invasion hinges on the mere fact of overhearing, 
that conception of privacy transforms everything that passes through 
one's audiovisual attention field into eavesdropping. 
Finally, the mere fact that certain governments are moving to put 
their public records online has struck some stakeholders as particularly 
invasive. However, as Helen Nissenbaum noted, the records in question 
are already public; putting them online is a mere administrative conve-
225. See Bates, supra note 60, at 432. 
226. During a 1995 episode of "Seinfeld" entitled "The Sponge," George and his girlfriend 
Susan get into a fight about sharing secrets, with Susan arguing that it is assumed secrets will be 
shared between boyfriends and girlfriends. George eventually reveals to Susan that Jerry took a 
woman's number off an AIDS Walk list. Jerry later resists sharing another secret with George 
because he assumes George will share again. Seinfeld: The Sponge (West-Shapiro Dec. 7, 1995). 
227. See, e.g., Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 18, at 121 ("When the 
popular media writes about these webs of personal information from time to time, many react with 
indignation."); see also DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 24, at 1-7 (introducing the "problem of 
digital dossiers" and highlighting the associated privacy concerns). 
228. Solove calls this the "secrecy paradigm." DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 24, at 8. 
229. See Diekema, supra note 137, at 488; Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an 
Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 L. & PHIL. 559, 559-60 (1998) (positing 
that privacy should extend beyond "intimate and sensitive information" to the public sphere); see 
also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIvACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 123-25 (1988). 
Anita Allen states "anonymity is wrongfully disturbed if uninvited attention is paid or drawn to a 
person without justification." Id. at 124. 
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nience, not an invasion of privacy in any traditional understanding of the 
term.230 
Each example has a behavioral, interactional element that affects 
both parties, and each behavior becomes an invasion of privacy because 
it violates the trust we have that others will behave in expected ways. 
Unannounced entry, whether into a bathroom or onto another's blanket 
on an empty beach, breaches the trust and discretion implied by occupy-
ing a space. Reading a diary violates the trust we have that others will 
not pierce the implied barrier of the diary's clasp. A person with whom 
you discuss work, sports, love, mortgage payments, and your daughters' 
dirty diapers231 may be able to ask about a recent sexual dalliance, but 
the same question from a casual friend at work232 may not only strike 
you as invasive but could be considered harassment. Given the context, 
such a question breaches the trust we place in members of our individual 
social networks that they will continue to behave in a manner appropri-
ate to the relative closeness of our relationship. Revealing secrets to a 
spouse is not a breach of another's privacy because we expect strong 
trust and communication in marital relationships, but revelation to a 
well-connected socialite at a bridge or golf game may extinguish our 
expectations of privacy because the nature of the relationship indicates a 
low level of expectations of confidentiality.233 Data gathering, aggrega-
tion, categorization, and subsequent disclosure to third parties could not 
constitute invasions of privacy under a "secrecy paradigm":234 they do 
not take away our control over our information because we already gave 
up control when we disclosed details about ourselves to banks, con-
sumer websites, and governmental agencies. Rather, the process may be 
perceived as an invasion of our privacy because the subsequent actions 
taken with our data violate the expectations we had of the behavior of 
third parties in whom we entrusted our data. 
The notion that invasions of privacy are based on erosions of 
230. Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 18, at 120-21. 
231. Social network theorists would call this a "strong tie," or people with whom we share a lot 
of different information about a variety of topics. It is also called a high "intensity" relationship. 
See JOHN SCOTI', SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: A HANDBOOK 32 (2d ed. 2000); Gabriel Weimann, 
The Strength of Weak Conversational Ties in the Flow of Infonnation and Influence, 5 Soc. 
NETWORKS 245, 246 (1983). 
232. Single-issue friendships at work may be called "weak ties" or "low intensity" 
relationships. Cf Scurr, supra note 231, at 35 (discussing "the relatively weak ties of less 
frequent contacts"). 
233. The well-connected socialite is a "supemode" in social network theory. He is a hub at the 
center of several networks and may have strong ties to people in different networks, thus 
increasing the likelihood that information he receives will be further, and widely, disclosed. Cf id. 
at 83 (discussing how a central point that is close to many other points is "well-connected" or "in 
the thick of things"). 
234. See DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 24, at 8. 
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expectations of trust becomes even clearer when we consider acquain-
tanceship and staring.235 We expect, or trust, that no one-not even 
strangers-will stare at us. But staring can happen in public and requires 
no personal disclosure other than presence, so it is not clear what tradi-
tional understanding of privacy, other than the amorphous personhood 
concept, is implicated. Rather, staring violates our trust that no one will 
tum us into objects of gawking expressions and leering eyes. Therefore, 
our privacy is also invaded. 
We expect that acquaintances will continue to behave like acquain-
tances should, a manifestation of particularized trust in groups of others. 
Georg Simmel argues that acquaintanceship can only work because of 
discretion; a casual acquaintance shows discretion not by keeping a 
secret he accidentally overhears, but by restraining himself from ever 
getting into a position where he oversteps the boundaries of the acquain-
tanceship in the first place,236 Simmel adds that certain relationships 
demand that both parties reciprocally refrain from intruding in the range 
of things not included in the underlying relationship,237 Your friends 
from church or the gym or an extracurricular affinity group may invade 
your privacy by asking any question, regardless of its ranking on your 
own personal intimacy scale, about your life outside the church, gym, or 
that group. This explains why a question can seem inappropriate in one 
context and engender no objections in another. Trust and discretion, 
Simmel says, circumscribe all types of relationships and allows them to 
be born, survive, and endure.238 It also explains how privacy-as-trust 
works among different social networks: the imposition of an acquain-
tance into a social situation more appropriate for a friend or intimate 
may be considered an invasion of privacy. Different social networks 
operate under different norms of confidentiality, trust, and discretion. 
Therefore, the fate of privacy interests in information disclosed to a 
given social network varies based on the relational expectations we have 
for that network. 
This is also evident in Erving Goffman's explanation for why star-
ing and "intrusive 100ks"239 are invasions of privacy. Staring, Goffman 
writes, is not an ordinary or appropriate social interaction.240 We stare at 
zoo monkeys, not people, so the invasion of privacy must either be a 
235. See RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 50, at 45 (calling "intrusive looks" an "offense," 
while saying a "direct gaze is often not an invasion" because it can serve purposes other than 
being intrusive). 
236. Simmel, supra note 3, at 452. 
237. Id. at 458. 
238. See id. at 444-45, 452. 
239. RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 50, at 45. 
240. BEHAVIOR IN PuBLIC PLACES, supra note 2, at 86. 
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threat to the victim's dignity as an end in itself, per Kant, or a breach of 
some implied duty that strangers owe one another. Goffman argues the 
latter, calling it a duty "civil inattention."241 This concept is just one 
formulation of social trust. 
Civil inattention is a form of polite recognition of strangers, mani-
festing itself in nods of acknowledgment alongside a respectful modesty 
not to intrude where you do not belong. Staring at a physically injured or 
deformed bystander is the antithesis of civil inattention. In this example, 
the target might consider his injury "a personal matter which [he] would 
like to keep private,"242 but the fact that it is visible makes it publicly 
obvious. This obvious injury "differs from most other personal mat-
ters"-namely, those personal or private things that go on in the private 
sphere-because everyone has access to the injury regardless of how 
much the target would like to keep it secret.243 We are told not to stare 
precisely because the behavior's abnormality disrupts the normal course 
of social interaction appropriate for strangers. It has been known to 
cause fear and flight244 and runs counter to our expectations of how 
strangers are supposed to behave. 
Even as bystanders and strangers, Goffman concludes that we owe 
a duty to other individuals to treat them with discretion, and we expect 
and trust that others will do the same for us. Every interaction includes 
bystanders' social obligation to protect social actors so that their interac-
tions can continue. We have a "tactful tendency ... to act in a protective 
way in order to help the performers save their own show,"245 Goffman 
writes, using his theatrical conceit to analogize to everyday social inter-
action. This tact is simply another word for discretion and respect, and 
we trust that it will be there. We also owe a measure of "tactful inatten-
tion" to neighboring conversations and nearby individuals to guarantee 
the "effective privacy" of others, a principle colloquially encapsulated 
by the phrase, "keep one's nose out of other people's" business.246 Pri-
vacy invasions, therefore, are not simple intrusions into personal terri-
tory247 or the disclosure of negative behaviors;248 rather, they are 
socially inappropriate behaviors that violate the trust we have in others. 
Putting this all together, privacy-as-trust, then, could create a rela-
241. [d. at 85. 
242. [d. at 86. 
243. [d. at 86-87. 
244. Phoebe C. Ellsworth et aI., The Stare as a Stimulus to Flight in Human Subjects: A Series 
of Field Experiments, 21 J. PERSONALITY & Soc:. PSYCHOL. 302, 302 (1972). 
245. GOFFMAN, supra note 52, at 229. 
246. [d. at 230. 
247. See supra Part II.A.1. 
248. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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tionship between sharers and recipients of personal data that is akin to a 
beneficiary-trustee, or fiduciary, relationship. Dan Solove made a sirni-
lar proposal in The Digital Person,249 but never discussed the salient role 
of trust in the process and ultimately supported several proposals based 
on a choice and control conception of privacy. The recipients of our 
information are entrusted with that information, to safeguard it or use it 
properly. That notion is reflected in the factors we use to determine the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship, which includes "the extent to which 
[one] ... party entrusted the handling of ... business affairs to the other 
and reposed faith and confidence in [the latter party]."250 In the sections 
that follow, I will review the social science literature to determine the 
factors necessary for creating that trusting relationship in the unique 
context of sharing personal information with others. 
C. The Sociology of Trust 
For all the research and analysis on trust done by social psycholo-
gists, sociologists, economists, and others, there is still some disagree-
ment on how to conceptualize truSt.251 The disagreement is regrettable, 
and not entirely unexpected, but not fatal to this Article's argument. 
Social scientists may disagree on the margins, but an extensive review of 
the literature on trust evidences broad agreement at its core. Most agree 
that trust is a "favourable expectation regarding . . . the actions and 
intentions"252 of particular "people or groups of people, whether known" 
or unknown, whether "in-group" or out-group,z53 This kind of trust is 
what sociologists call particularized social trust: it is interpersonal, 
directed at specific other people or groups, and forms the basis of per-
son-to-person interaction,z54 It allows us to take risks,255 cooperate with 
249. See DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 24, at 102-03 (positing that businesses that are 
collecting personal infonnation from us should "stand in a fiduciary relationship with us"). 
250. Pottinger v. Pottinger, 605 N.E.2d 1130, 1138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (quoted in DIGITAL 
PERSON, supra note 24, at 103). 
251. See Peter Nannestad, What Have We Learned About Generalized Trust, if Anything?, 11 
ANN. REv. POL. SCI. 413, 414-32 (2008) (collecting and summarizing the social science literature 
on trust). 
252. See Guido Mollering, The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of 
Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension, 35 SOCIOLOGY 403 (2001). 
253. Ken Newton & Sonja Zmerli, Three Forms of Trust and Their Association, 3 EUR. POL. 
SCI. REv. 169, 171 (2011). 
254. See, e.g., id. at 170-72. 
255. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 91 (1990) (discussing how 
people can take risks that are "depend[ant] on the perfonnance of another actor" because they trust 
that other actor). 
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others,256 make decisions despite complexity,257 and create order in 
chaos,258 among so many other everyday functions. Trust not only has 
positive effects on society,259 it is also essential to all social interaction, 
is at the heart of how we decide to share information about ourselves, 
and helps explain when we feel our privacy invaded. 
1. WHAT IS TRUST? 
Particularized social trust is one of three types of sociological 
trust,260 all of which are related and interconnected. Particularized trust 
is the kind of trust implicated when we share things with or interact with 
others: A trusts B to do x, where x can be keeping a secret, doing a job 
well, or not listening in on a two-way conversation. This kind of trust is 
sometimes assumed to be entirely based on past knowledge. Russell 
Hardin thinks so, arguing that "[f]or me to trust you, I have to know a 
fair amount about yoU."261 But, as Eric Uslaner has noted, past experi-
256. See Diego Gambetta, Foreward to TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE 
RELATIONS ix, ix (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (saying "cooperation is predicated [on] trust"). 
257. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 4 (1979) (saying that without trust, it would be 
impossible to endure "the complexity of the world"). 
258. See generally BARBARA A. MISZTAL, TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES: THE SEARCH FOR THE 
BASES OF SOCIAL ORDER (1996) (discussing the relationship between trust and social cohesion). 
259. Trust has been shown to contribute to economic success, effective civic engagement, and 
health. See S.V. Subramanian et aI., Social Trust and Self-Rated Health in U.S. Communities: A 
Multilevel Analysis, 79 J. URBAN HEALTH S21, S21-22 (2002); Charles M. Tolbert et aI., Local 
Capitalism, Civic Engagement, and Socioeconomic Well-Being, 77 Soc. FORCES 401, 405-06 
(1998) (discussing the positive impact social institutions can have on civic engagement while 
relying on the idea that U[s]ome institutions ... are more likely to foster trust and civic 
embededness" than others); Gerry Veenstra, Social Capital, SES and Health: An Individual-Level 
Analysis, 50 Soc. SCI. & MED. 619, 620 (2000) (summarizing literature on interesting correlates 
with trust, such as economic activity and smooth political functioning). Organizations with a high 
level of trust are also more efficient and tend to outperform competitors. See Jeffrey L. Bradach & 
Robert G. Eccles, Price, Authority, and Trust: From Ideal Types to Plural Forms, 15 ANN. REv. 
Soc. 97,107 (1989). According to several scholars, trust reduces transaction costs in this context. 
See id. at 104-07 for a general discussion of trust as a market efficiency control mechanism; see 
also MARl SAKO, PRICES, QUALITY AND TRUST: INTER-FIRM RELATIONS IN BRITAIN AND JAPAN 
47-48 (1992). 
260. The related concepts are general social trust, which captures whether people generally 
think people can be trusted, and institutional trust, which refers to the trust individuals have in 
government or institutions. These concepts are derived from the sociological literature. Indeed, 
trust has to be a sociological concept. "[T]rust must be conceived as a property of collective units 
(ongoing dyads, groups, and collectives), not of isolated individuals .... [T]rust is applicable to 
the relations among people rather than to their psychological states taken individually." J. David 
Lewis & Andrew Weigert, Trust as a Social Reality, 63 Soc. FORCES 967, 968 (1985). 
261. Russell Hardin, The Public Trust, in DISAFFECTED DEMOCRACIES: WHAT'S TROUBLING 
THE TRILATERAL COUNTRIES 31, 34 (Susan J. Pharr & Robert D. Putnam eds., 2000); see also 
LUHMANN, supra note 257, at 43; Claus Offe, How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens, in 
DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 42, 56 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999); Toshio Yamagishi & Midori 
Yamagishi, Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan, 18 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 
129, 130 (1994) (discussing survey that showed that less than half of Americans who were 
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ence is only one basis for trusting particular people.262 Another basis for 
trusting particular people is common identity, or faith "in your own 
kind." 263 This is akin to Max Weber's famous analysis of capitalism in 
America; he thought that common membership in the Protestant sect in 
early America allowed people who did not really know each other to 
trust that they would be competent contractual partners,264 Talcott Par-
sons agreed, arguing that trust between persons required common values 
and common goals: "People defined as sharing one's values or concrete 
goals and in whose competence and integrity one has 'confidence' come 
to be thought of as 'trustworthy individuals' or 'types.' "265 Trust, in this 
sense, is akin to familiarity, but familiarity can be derived through previ-
ous experience or a common identity. 
This form of trust is derived from Georg Simmel's "specific, 
dynamic, and situational" trust-the trust we have in each other,266 It is 
about creating and reacting to expectations of others' behavior, and it is 
at the foundation of almost every daily social interaction, including our 
sharing of personal information. Simmel knew this; he said that society 
would disintegrate without the trust that people have in each other,267 As 
the sociologist Niklas Luhmann noted, trust in others is so essential that 
an "absence of trust would prevent [a man] even from getting up in the 
morning. "268 
What sociologists mean by this type of experiential trust is a set of 
favorable expectations about the behavior of others. Every time we cross 
an intersection, we do so with a baseline of trust that the oncoming car is 
not going to run the red light; every time we enter a crowded subway 
car, we trust that the passenger sitting in the corner is not going to pull 
out a gun; when we extend a hand for a handshake, we trust it will be 
met with someone else's (clean) hand. We trust that our parents and 
loved ones will keep our secrets and that our acquaintances will not start 
behaving like distant strangers or intimate friends. Particularized trust 
makes it possible to deal with uncertainty and complexity,269 Knowledge 
questioned thought they could trust "most people," while only about one quarter of Japanese 
people thought they could trust "most people"). 
262. See Eric M. Uslaner, Producing and Consuming Trust, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 569,573 (2000). 
263. See id. 
264. See MAX WEBER, The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism, in FROM MAX 
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 302, 312 (H. H. Gerth & c. Wright Mills eds., 1946). 
265. TALCOIT PARSONS, AcnON THEORY AND THE HUMAN CONDmoN 47 (1978). 
266. Lewis & Weigert, supra note 21, at 458. 
267. GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 191 (David Frisby ed., Tom Bottomore & 
David Frisby trans., 2011) ("Without the general trust that people have in each other, society itself 
would disintegrate .... "). 
268. LUHMANN, supra note 257, at 4. 
269. See id. at 4. 
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is costly and hard to come by, and often decisions and actions have to 
come before knowledge even exists?70 As Simmel implied,271 and 
Luhmann made more explicit, "trust begins where knowledge ends."272 
Particularized trust is as necessary, if not more so, than generalized, 
or "metaphysical," truSt.273 If the former is directed at specific other per-
sons or groups of persons, general social trust is more diffuse, referring 
to the belief that most people can be trusted, even if you do not know 
them and even if they are not like yoU.274 Those who exude general 
social trust are trusting and optimistic people.27s And, finally, there is 
political or institutional trust, which focuses our trust onto institutions or 
agents and agencies of government. 276 These forms of trust are all 
related.277 Some scholars see them on a continuum of "personal" to 
"abstract," referring to the focus of trust, or from "thick" to "thin" or 
"high density" to "low density," referring to the ties that sustain truSt.278 
Suffice it to say that although the concepts are intimately related, I focus 
my analysis on particularized trust for several reasons. 
First, particularized trust is everywhere. It is reasonable to assume 
that everyone trusts at least someone.279 Second, particularized trust 
needs further study. Social scientists have famously and extensively 
studied general and political trust, as well as its determinants and the 
effects of its decline in society. 280 Third, this form of trust is in play 
270. See Lewis & Weigert, supra note 21, at 462 (noting that it is "costly and time-consuming" 
to acquire knowledge, and most decisions need to rely on some degree of trust because it may be 
impossible to acquire enough knowledge to remove all uncertainty about the future). 
271. See Simmel, supra note 3, at 441 ("[A]pprehension of external nature, along with its 
elusions and its inaccuracies, still attains that degree of truth which is essential for the life and 
progress of our species .... "); Georg Simmel, Types of Social Relationships by Degrees of 
Reciprocal Knowledge of Their Participants, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 317, 318 
(Kurt H. Wolff ed., trans., 1950) ("The person who knows completely need not trust .... "). 
272. Lewis & Weigert, supra note 21, at 462 (analyzing Niklas Luhmann's work). 
273. See id. at 458 (analyzing Georg Simmel's concept of metaphysical trust). 
274. See Newton & Zmerli, supra note 253, at 171 (discussing how and why general trust is 
widespread); see also Uslaner, supra note 263, at 573 ("Generalized trust is the belief that most 
people can be trusted[, whereas p]articularized trust is faith only in your own kind."). 
275. See Uslaner, supra note 262, at 573-74. 
276. See Newton & Zmerli, supra note 253, at 169-70. 
277. See id. at 172-73 ("A reading of the large and growing social science literature suggests 
that there are three main models of trust. ... One [model] claims that different types of social and 
political trust tend to fit together ... [while another] model suggests a more complicated pattern in 
which some but not all forms of trust fit together."). 
278. See id. at 171. 
279. See id. (citing Eric M. Uslaner, Democracy and Social Capital, in DEMOCRACY AND 
TRUST 121, 123 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999». 
280. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PuTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 347-49 (2000) (arguing, in part, that the decline of community 
involvement has contributed to a decline in trust among citizens and a decline in the political 
health of our society). 
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when someone shares personal information: A shares x with B because A 
trusts B with x. Therefore, it is essential to speak about privacy alongside 
particularized trust. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, particularized 
trust is a necessary condition for the development of social and political 
trust,281 both of which are overwhelmingly positive forces in society. 
Trust is essential in a modem, heterogeneous society where social, eco-
nomic, and political actors do not know each other. 282 It is the "bedrock 
of cooperation" and fosters economic prosperity.283 It makes democratic 
institutions run better, more efficiently, and less corruptly.284 It helps 
connect us to people different from us and encourages sharing and 
greater, more meaningful interaction.285 Trust is a good thing. We need a 
more trusting society. And centering the law of privacy on protecting 
and fostering relationships of trust is a significant step forward. 
281. This conclusion has been the source of considerable debate in the social science literature 
and, although universal consensus is elusive, many scholars agree that there is a positive, yet 
conditional relationship between particularized trust on the one hand, and general and political 
trust on the other. For a decade, many sociologists argued that the forms of trust were 
incompatible: if you only trust people you know or only trust those who look like you, you will 
not trust strangers or anyone with whom you do not share experience or identity. See, e.g., 
Kenneth Newton, Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies, in CRITICAL CmZENS: 
GLOBAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 169 (Pippa Norris ed., 1999) (discussing 
correlations between measures of trust and the social, economic, and political barriers of trust); 
ERIC M. USLANER, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST 54 (2002) (discussing the correlation 
between generalized and specific trust); Yamagishi & Yamagishi, supra note 261, at 160 
(concluding that "Americans responded . . . much higher in general trust than Japanese 
respondents"); Toshio Yamagishi et aI., In-Group Bias and Culture of Collectivism, I ASIAN J. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 315 (1998) (analyzing the likelihood of giving favor to in-group members because 
of a preference to do so). More recently, several scholars have shown that particularized trust can 
promote general trust, or that trusting individuals you know makes you more trusting and can help 
you trust strangers and society, in general. See, e.g., Paul F. Whiteley, The Origins of Social 
Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL AND EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY 25, 41 (Jan W. van Deth et a1. eds., 
1999) (concluding that "face-to-face interactions within voluntary organisations" and "the 
socialisation process within the family" creates trust); see generally Jennifer L. Glanville & Paula 
Paxton, How Do We Learn to Trust? A Confirmatory Tetrad Analysis of the Sources of 
Generalized Trust, 70 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 230, 238 (2007) (finding that individuals assess the 
trustworthiness of people based off of generalizations from experiences). Ken Newton and Sonja 
Zmerli have argued that particularized trust and general and political trust are positively correlated 
in some cases. They argue, and show through empirical study, that those who exhibit general trust 
also exhibit particularized trust; however, it will not always be the case that those who trust other 
people, in particular, will necessarily and always become trusting people, in general. Newton & 
Zmerli, supra note 253, at 176. This suggests that particular trust is a necessary component of 
general trust but not necessarily sufficient. 
282. See Newton & Zmerli, supra note 253, at 171; see also Nannestad, supra note 251, at 422. 
283. See Nannestad, supra note 251, at 422. 
284. See id. at 428-30. 
285. See Eric M. Uslaner & Richard S. Conley, Civic Engagement and Particularized Trust: 
The Ties That Bind People to Their Ethnic Communities, 31 AM. POL. REs. 331, 332 (2003). 
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2. How DOES TRUST DEVELOP? 
So far, I have defined trust-favorable expectations as to the 
behavior of others-and connected trust to privacy by showing that 
invasions of privacy are felt as such because they breach our expecta-
tions of trust. It remains for us to prove how trust develops between 
persons and use this evidence to develop clear guidelines for judges and 
policymakers when assessing whether disclosures occurred in contexts 
of trust. Because of the salience of trust in our decisions to share, trust is 
what makes an expectation of privacy reasonable: it is reasonable to 
share in a given context if that context is trustworthy. And given that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy is usually a necessary precondition to 
winning privacy protection,286 the genesis of trust is an essential step to 
be understood. To do this, I have studied the current social science 
research on the development of trust and concluded that trust can rea-
sonably develop among intimates and friends as well as among 
strangers. 
Among intimates, trust may emerge over time as the product of an 
iterative exchange;287 this type of trust is relatively simple to understand 
and generally considered reasonable. Therefore, I will spend little time 
proving the reasonableness of trust among intimates. But social scien-
tists have found that trust among strangers can be just as strong and 
lasting as trust among intimates, even without the option of a repeated 
game. Trust among strangers emerges, in relevant part, from three social 
bases-sharing a stigmatizing identity, sharing trustworthy friends, and 
other forms of transference. When these social elements are part of the 
totality of the context of a sharing incident among relative strangers, that 
context should be considered trustworthy and, thus, a reasonable place 
for sharing. 
Traditionally, social scientists argued that trust developed rationally 
over time as part of an ongoing process of engagement with another: if A 
interacts with B over time and B acts in a trustworthy manner during 
those interactions, A is in a better position to predict that B will act 
trustworthily the next time they interact.288 The more previous interac-
tions, the more data points A has on which to base his trust. 289 This 
286. The generally accepted reasonable expectation of privacy test, derived from Justice 
Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), states that a person 
must "exhibit[ ] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and ... that the expectation [is] one 
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
287. See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 98-99 (1964); John K. 
Rempel et aI., Trust in Close Relationships, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 95, 96 (1985). 
288. See, e.g., Rempel et. al., supra note 287, at 96. 
289. See Patricia M. Doney et al., Understanding the Influence of National Culture on the 
Development of Trust, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 601, 605 (1998) ("[T]he greater the variety of 
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prediction process is based on past behavior and assumes the trustor's 
rationality as a predictor.29o Given those assumptions, it seems relatively 
easy to trust people with whom we interact often?91 
But trust also develops among strangers, none of whom have the 
benefit of repeated interaction to make fully informed and completely 
rational decisions about others?92 In fact, a decision to trust is never 
wholly rational, it is a probability determination; "trust begins where 
knowledge ends."293 What's more, in certain circumstances, trust is also 
strong early on, something that would seem impossible under a 
probability approach to truSt.294 Sometimes, that early trust among stran-
gers is the result of a cue of expertise, a medical or law degree, for 
example.295 But trust among lay strangers cannot be based on expertise 
or repeated interaction, and yet, such trust is quite common. 
I argue that reasonable trust among strangers emerges when one of 
two things happen: (1) when strangers share a stigmatizing social iden-
tity, or (2) when strangers share strong ties in an overlapping network. 
Here, we transfer the trust we have in others to a stranger or use the 
stranger's friends as a cue to his trustworthiness. Sociologists call this a 
transference process, whereby we take information about a known entity 
and extend it to an unknown entity.296 This explains why trust via 
accreditation works: we transfer the trust we have in a degree from a 
good law school, which we know, to one of its graduates, whom we do 
not know. We are willing to trust doctors we have never met even before 
they give us attentive care, exhibit a friendly bedside manner, or show 
deep knowledge of what ails us because we trust their expertise, as 
embodied by the degrees that hang on their walls. Transference can also 
work among persons. The sociologist Mark Granovetter has shown that 
economic actors transfer trust to an unknown party based on how 
shared experiences, the greater the generated knowledge base and the more a target's behavior 
becomes predictable.") (citation omitted). 
290. See id.; see also David Good, Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust, in TRUST: 
MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 31, 32 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988). 
291. See Michael W. Macy & John Skvoretz, The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation Between 
Strangers: A Computational Model, 63 AM. Soc. REv. 638, 648, 655-56 (1998). 
292. See, e.g., D. Harrison McKnight et aI., Initial Trust Formation in New Organizational 
Relationships, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 473, 473 (1998). 
293. Lewis & Weigert, supra note 21, at 462. 
294. See D. Harrison McKnight et aI., supra note 292, at 473. 
295. See Doney et aI., supra note 289, at 606-07. 
296. Id. at 606-07 (citing Ronald E. Milliman & David L. Fugate, Using Trust-Transference 
as a Persuasion Technique: An Empirical Field Investigation, 8 J. ?ERS. SELLING & SALES MGMT. 
1,3,6 (1988); Peter J. Strub & T. B. Priest, Two Patterns of Establishing Trust: The Marijuana 
User, 9 Soc. Focus 399, 406 (1976»; see also id. at 616. 
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embedded the new person is in a familiar and trusted social network.297 
That is why networking is so important to getting ahead in any industry 
and why recommendation letters from senior, well-regarded, or 
renowned colleagues are often most effective. This is the theory of 
strong overlapping networks: someone will do business with you, hire 
you as an employee, trade with you, or enter into a contract with you not 
only if you know a lot of the same people, but if you know a lot of the 
right people, the trustworthy people, the parties with whom others have 
a long, positive history. So it's not just how many people you know, it's 
who you know. . 
The same is true outside the economic context. The Pew Research 
Center ("Pew") found that of those teenagers who use online social net-
works and have online "friends" that they have never met offline, about 
seventy percent of those "friends" had more than one mutual friend in 
comrnon?98 Although Pew did not distinguish between types of mutual 
friends, the survey found that this was among the strongest factors asso-
ciated with "friending" strangers online.299 More research is needed?OO 
The other social factor that creates trust among strangers is sharing 
a salient in-group identity.301 But such trust transference is not simply a 
case of privileging familiarity, at best, or discrimination, at worst. 
Rather, sharing an identity with a group that may face discrimination or 
has a long history of fighting for equal rights is a proxy for one of the 
greatest sources of trust among persons: sharing values.302 At the outset, 
sharing an in-group identity is an easy shorthand for common values 
and, therefore, is a reasonable basis for trust among strangers?03 
Social scientists call transferring known in-group trust to an 
unknown member of that group category-driven processing304 or charac-
teristic-based truSt.305 But I argue that it cannot just be any group or any 
297. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985). 
298. AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEw INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TEENS, 
PRIVACY, AND ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS: How TEENS MANAGE THEIR ONLINE IDENTITIES AND 
PERSONAL INFORMATION IN THE AGE OF MySPACE 32 (2007), available at http://www.pewinter 
net.org/files/old-mediaJlFileslReportsI2007IPIP _Teens_Privacy _SNS_Report_Final. pdf. pdf. 
299. See id. 
300. See infra Part V. 
301. See Michele Williams, In Whom We Trust: Group Membership as an Affective Context 
for Trust Development, 26 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 377, 381, 385 (2001) (discussing how "[p]eople 
tend to associate positive beliefs and feelings with the groups to which they belong"). 
302. Helmut Anheier & Jeremy Kendall, Interpersonal Trust and Voluntary Associations: 
Examining Three Approaches, 53 BRIT. J. Soc. 343, 350-51 (2002) (discussing how trust can be 
based on "similarity in culture, values and behaviour"). 
303. See Williams, supra note 301, at 380-81. 
304. See id. at 381,385. 
305. Anheier & Kendall, supra note 302, 350-51. 
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identity; trust is transferred when a stranger is a member of an in-group, 
the identity of which is defining or important for the trustor. For exam-
ple, we do not see greater trust between men and other men perhaps 
because the identity of manhood is not a salient in-group identity.306 
More likely, the status of being a man is not an adequate cue that a male 
stranger shares your values. Trust forms and is maintained with persons 
with similar goals and values and a perceived interest in maintaining the 
trusting relationship?07 But it is the sharing of values you find most 
important that breeds trust in the first instance.308 For example, members 
of the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) community are, 
naturally, more likely to support the freedom to marry for gays and les-
bians than are members of any other group?09 Therefore, sharing an in-
group identity that constitutes an important part of a trustor's persona 
operates as a cue that the trustee shares values important to that group. 
There are several reasons why these factors-salient in-group iden-
tity and strong overlapping social networks-are the proper bases for 
establishing when trust among strangers is reasonable and, therefore, 
when the privacy of those contexts should be protected by society. First, 
it represents the best social science research into human behavior. It 
reflects how we actually behave and helps determine when we share our 
personal information with others. Legal rules that reflect and foster posi-
tive social behavior have the best chance of success and of making soci-
ety better. Second, these are reasonable bases for trust. It is hard to argue 
that trusting based on experience, identity, and strong overlapping net-
works is reckless. Third, and most importantly for the law of privacy, in 
a world where sharing with strangers is important for modem digital life, 
that most people trust others through these transference processes 
should, at a minimum, suggest their cultural and social pervasiveness. 
306. Cf Doney et ai., supra note 289, at 612 (,The transfer of trust is also inhibited in 
masculine societies because it is difficult for trustors to identify trusted proof sources from which 
they may transfer trust to an unknown target. Masculine societies are associated with 
independence, and people tend to show a skeptical view of others.") (citation omitted). 
307. See Frederique Six et ai., Actions That Build Interpersonal Trust: A Relational Signalling 
Perspective, 68 REv. Soc. ECON. 285, 290 (2010); see also Michael R. Welch et ai., The Radius of 
Trust: Religion, Social Embeddedness and Trust in Strangers, 86 Soc. FORCES 23, 25-26 (2007). 
308. See Gareth R. Jones & Jennifer M. George, The Experience and Evolution of Trust: 
Implications for Cooperation and Teamwork, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 531, 532 (1998) ("An 
individual whose value system emphasizes loyalty and honesty, for example, will strive to achieve 
loyalty and honesty in his or her relationships with others. Values contribute to the generalized 
experience of trust and can even create a propensity to trust .... "). 
309. PEw RESEARCH CTR., A SURVEY OF LGBT AMERICANS: A1TITUDES, EXPERIENCES AND 
VALUES IN CHANGING TIMES 3 (2013), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.orglfilesI20l3/06/ 
SDLLGBT-Americans_06-20l3.pdf. 
610 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:559 
D. Benefits of the Approach 
The theory of privacy-as-trust has several advantages over conven-
tional theories of privacy. First, as previously noted, privacy-as-trust is a 
pragmatic, bottom-up approach that reflects how social actors behave in 
everyday situations31O and how we understand what it means to have our 
privacy invaded.3l1 Analyses of human behavior are also better bases for 
policy: public opinion polls can reflect mere whims, whereas the point 
of the law is to protect and encourage socially beneficial behavior.312 A 
coherent doctrine based on human behavior is, therefore, a qualitatively 
superior and likely more effective foundation for legal policy. 
It is also more determinate and functional for judges and policy 
makers: it asks judges to determine where trust exists and then, where 
found, to protect it via an operative tort or constitutional tool. Too often, 
judges have been forced to approach privacy litigation without a clear 
understanding of the values at stake and the purposes and goals of pri-
vacy. Alan Westin recognized this issue in 1967: "Few values so funda-
mental to society as privacy have been left so undefined in social 
theory .... "313 Robert Post called privacy "a value so complex, so 
entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with 
various and distinct meanings,"314 that it is no surprise scholars and 
judges give up on bringing coherence to it. Myriad other scholars have 
voiced the same lament.315 This is especially problematic when a pri-
vacy right comes in conflict with another right-the right to speak, for 
example-whose contours and goals are clearer: privacy will usually 
lose. In this Article, I have provided clear guidelines for judges and 
policymakers to use when assessing disclosures in contexts of trust. And 
although some may argue that my proposal would tum judges into 
310. So far, the conclusion ihat privacy-as-trust reflects real behavior has been based on 
previous analyses of social interaction, from Simmel, Goffman, Luhmann, and oihers. This work 
is supplemented by my own quantitative fieldwork on trust and sharing on online social networks 
in my doctoral dissertation. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in 
a Networked World (2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (manuscript on 
file wiih auihor). 
311. This was Daniel Solove's advice in Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 14. 
312. See, e.g., ROGER COlTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 4-6 (1992). 
313. WESTIN, supra note 169, at 7. 
314. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001). 
315. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PuBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.59 (2010) 
("Like ihe emotive word 'freedom,' 'privacy' means so many different ihings to so many different 
people ihat it has lost any precise legal connotation ihat it might once have had."); Judiih Jarvis 
Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in PHiLOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIvACY 272 (Ferdinand D. 
Schoeman ed., 1984) ("Perhaps ihe most striking thing about ihe right to privacy is ihat nobody 
seems to have any very clear idea what it is."); Gerety, supra note 87, at 234-35 (discussing ihe 
utility and expansiveness surrounding ihe concept of privacy); Gross, supra note 59, at 34 (we 
"stumble when trying to make clear what privacy is"). 
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armchair sociologists, such criticism misses the fact that we already do 
this. Judges are already tasked with determining when expectations of 
privacy are socially "reasonable."316 Where we have failed is in provid-
ing any helpful and practical guidance to help them consistently, hon-
estly, and justly along that journey. 
Second, privacy-as-trust protects and encourages social interaction 
with intimates and strangers alike. And this is a good thing. It protects 
sharing and intimacy in close knit relationships by respecting confidenti-
ality. It also appreciates the value in protecting interaction among stran-
gers, which make up the bulk of our everyday interactions. Many of our 
most enduring relationships begin as encounters among strangers, and 
most of our daily interactions-market transactions, for example-are 
ad hoc and rarely move beyond the initial stage of stranger trust. And 
despite the fact that, at bottom, they are still examples of two strangers 
interacting, they are essential for a functioning society? 17 
Bright-line rules about choice and exclusion apply universally and 
comprehensively; that was one of Professor Solove's main objections to 
the conventional theories.318 But trust and discretion may exist among 
one group in certain contexts but not in others. Members of the HN-
positive community are encouraged to-and many do-disclose their 
status to friends, family members, and medical professionals.319 Gene 
Shelley has shown that this disclosure takes place in a context of trust 
and discretion: other HN -positive individuals were much more likely to 
know about a fellow HN-positive person's status than his political affil-
iations, criminal history, income, religion, major life events, and so 
on.320 Those same members of the HN-positive network were also the 
most likely recipients of information on HIV status, even compared to 
family and friends. 321 Fear of stigmatization, homophobia, or worse 
made HN-positive individuals hesitate to disclose their status to certain 
people in certain networks, but it was the feeling of trust in other net-
works that encouraged them to share.322 To deny the reasonableness of 
these disclosures merely because the recipient of information is a stran-
316. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.s. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also 
supra note 286. 
317. See PuTNAM, supra note 280, at 93 (stating that interactions between strangers are 
"investment(sl in social capital"); see also Welch et aI., supra note 307, at 27 (discussing that 
many relationships begin as an "encounter( 1 between strangers," and while these relationships 
may not progress beyond that, they are still important "for the functioning of society as a whole"). 
318. See Solove, supra note 14, at 1090. 
319. See Gene A. Shelley et aI., Who Knows Your HN Status? What HIV+ Patients and Their 
Network Members Know About Each Other, 17 Soc. NETWORKS 189, 211 (1995). 
320. [d. at 203 fig.3. 
321. [d. at 203-04. 
322. [d. at 194, 204-13. 
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ger ignores the fact that trust can emerge among strangers in certain 
contexts and privileges a bright-line rule over the facts of online social 
interaction. 
On the micro level, social interaction with strangers can help the 
unemployed find jobs,323 expand opportunities for love,324 and create 
successful and enduring affiliations.325 On a macro level, it encourages 
tolerance,326 it socializes young people to the wider world, and it edu-
cates in areas that classroom study cannot. It also imbues the concept of 
a marketplace of ideas with real meaning. In his 2001 book, Repub-
lic.com, Cass Sunstein argued that Internet and digital technologies, in 
general, and aggregators and news feeds, in particular, may undermine 
democracy because they isolate citizens, allowing them to exist in an 
echo chamber with those who agree with them and apart from those with 
different ideas.327 Failure to protect our interactions with strangers has 
the same effect. If we are truly interested in creating a diverse pool of 
content from which to learn and grow, the law should encourage us to 
expose our thoughts and opinions to people who may have radically 
different ideas than our own.328 Any theory of privacy that disincen-
tivizes some measure of sharing and interaction with strangers, then, 
323. See, e.g., Susan Adams, Networking Is Still the Best Way to Find a Job, Survey Says, 
FORBES (June 7, 2011, 11:01 AM), http://www.forbes.comlsiteslsusanadams/2011/06/07/ 
networking-is-still-the-best-way-to-find-a-job-survey-saysl. 
324. See, e.g., BERNIE HOGAN ET AL., OXFORD INTERNET INST., A GLOBAL SHIFT IN THE 
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS OF NETWORKED INDIVIDUALS: MEETING AND DATING ONLINE COMES OF 
AGE 1,2,9 (2011), available at http://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk!couples/wp-contentiuploads/2010/09/Me-
MySpouse_GlobaIReporCHoganLiDutton.pdf. 
325. See Teck-Hua Ho & Keith Weigelt, Trust Building Among Strangers, 51 MGMT. SCI. 519, 
519 (2005) ("[Trust] holds immense strategic value for a group or organization of any size."). 
326. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE 
ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 181-82 (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001) 
(showing that affirmative action leads to more socialization across racial lines); COMPELLING 
INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND UNIvERsmEs 
131-32 (Mitchell J. Chang et a!. eds., 2003) (finding that affirmative action leads to decreased 
stereotyping and lower levels of ethnocentrism); SYLVIA HURTADO ET AL., ENACTING DIVERSE 
LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS: IMPROVING THE CLIMATE FOR RACIALIETHNIC DIVERSITY IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION iv-v, 19-21 (1999), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulitextlED430514.pdf 
(discussing how a more diverse student body allows for the reduction of racial conflict); Jeffrey F. 
Milem & Kenji Hakuta, The Benefits of Racial and Ethnic Diversity in Higher Education, in 
DEBORAH J. WILDS, MINORmES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL STATUS REpORT 
39, 39 (2000), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulitextlED457768.pdf; see also CHRISTOPHER 
EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES 
130 (1996) ("[I]nclusion and diversity correspond to the moral virtue of tolerance, which is a 
fundamental element in American political and civic cultural ideals."). 
327. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001). 
328. See id. at 199-200; cf Welch et aI., supra note 307, at 27 (discussing the importance of 
interactions with relative strangers in the "functioning of society as a whole"). 
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cripples the very core of a democratic society. 329 
Third, privacy-as-trust will be more effective at encouraging and 
protecting online social interaction. Internet and other cyber and digital 
technologies have replaced traditional media in everything from 
entertainmene30 and advertising33l to buying coffee.332 And sociological 
and economic studies suggest that online social networking and other 
digital platforms are unique places for sharing intimate details among 
strangers.333 Traditional theories of privacy offer no adequate protection 
for that behavior because they extinguish privacy rights upon pUblicity. 
But online platforms encourage the same perceptions of discretion and 
trust among strangers as they do among intimates.334 The law has reason 
to both value and protect social interaction with strangers; therefore, a 
social theory of privacy is more equipped to both reflect popular behav-
ior and encourage its social benefits. 
Fourth, privacy-as-trust is more familiar than it sounds. Robert 
Post's analysis of the purposes and effects of the tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion supports my argument.335 The tort, which protects against any 
form of invasion of "solitude or seclusion,"336 would seem, on its face, 
to reflect the common understanding of privacy as separation and exclu-
sion.337 Post argues, however, that the tort is meant to "safeguard[] rules 
329. See id. at 200 ("For citizens in a republic, freedom requires exposure to a diverse set of 
topics and opinions."). 
330. See, e.g., Brian Stelter, Youths Are Watching, But Less Often on TV, N.Y. TlMES (Feb. 8, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.coml20 12/02/09Ibusiness/medialyoung-people-are-watching-but -less-
often-on-tv.html?pagewanted==all (discussing how alternatives such as spending time online and 
using cell phones are replacing watching television). 
331. See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Google's Ad Targeting Goes Behavioral, S.F. GATE (Mar. 11, 
2009) http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/techchron/detail ?blo-gid== 19&entry _id==36840 
(discussing Google's plans to track user preferences online and then display advertisements that 
"reflect [people's] interests when they visit [a] partner website"). 
332. See Molly McHugh, How to Buy Starbucks Coffee with Your iPhone, DIGITAL TRENDS 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.comlmobilelhow-to-buy-starbucks-coffee-with-your-i 
phonel (discussing Starbucks' app allowing users to pay for coffee with their smartphones). 
333. See, e.g., MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEw INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TEENS, SOCIAL 
MEDIA, AND PRIVACY (2013), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/05IPIP_TeensSo 
ciaIMediaandPrivacy]DF.pdf (discussing the rise in social media and the resulting increase in 
sharing personal information online). 
334. An extensive literature suggests that this trust of strangers derives from the anonymity and 
pseudonymity provided by digital phones and online platforms. See id. at 2-3 ("[F]ew teens 
embrace a fully public approach to social media. Instead, they take an array of steps to restrict and 
prune their profiles .... "). The source of the trust is not my primary concern, however. What 
matters for the purposes of the social theory of privacy is that trust and discretion characterize 
interactions among strangers online. A theory of privacy based on that trust and discretion is more 
equipped to protect that human behavior than theories about choice and exclusion. 
335. See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Seifin 
the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 959-68 (1989). 
336. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
337. See supra Part IT.A.I (discussing "separation, sequestration, and exclusion"). 
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of civility that ... rest[] not upon a perceived opposition between per-
sons and social life, but rather upon their interdependence. ''338 Although 
he never articulated a social theory per se, his analysis accepts the role 
trust plays in social life and reflects how, as a governing theory, privacy-
as-trust would implement the tort. 
Post tells his story through the narrative of Hamberger v. East-
man.339 In that case, a landlord installed an eavesdropping device in a 
couple's bedroom, the revelation of which greatly distressed, humiliated, 
and offended the victims.340 In holding that the device was an invasion 
of privacy, the court was less concerned with whether, subjectively 
speaking, the plaintiffs were actually injured. Rather, the court relied on 
a broader objective principle: that the installation of the eavesdropping 
device was an intrusion "offensive to any person of ordinary sensibili-
ties."341 Or, to use the Restatement's language, "highly offensive to a 
reasonable person. "342 This makes the tort of intrusion rather unique 
among torts. Successfully litigating most tort claims usually requires the 
plaintiffs to prove that the defendant's underlying action actually caused 
some harm or damage.343 Claims of negligence, for example, require a 
showing that the defendant's negligence in driving a car or operating a 
crane caused some "demonstrable injury."344 But, as Post notes, the tort 
of intrusion is different: the offense is the action per se; the action does 
not need attendant negative effects to become offensive.345 This turns 
the plaintiff from the recipient of personal injury, in the case of most 
torts, to the victim of a breach of a social norm that we impliedly owe 
one another.346 Post would say that norm is "civility";347 I would say 
trust. The tort of intrusion "focuses the law not on actual injury ... but 
rather on the protection of [the individual as] constituted by full obser-
vance of the relevant rules of deference and demeanor," per Goffman.348 
338. Post, supra note 335, at 959-60. 
339. See id. at 959; see also Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (1964). 
340. Hamberger, 206 A.2d at 239-40. 
341. [d. at 242. 
342. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
343. See, e.g., Post, supra note 335, at 964 ("[A] lawsuit against you for [a tort] can succeed 
only if it establishes that your [tortious] behavior has actually caused some demonstrable injury. 
The basic idea is 'no harm, no foul.' "). 
344. See, e.g., id. 
345. See id. at 964-65. 
346. See id. at 959, 965 ("[T]he tort does not simply uphold the interests of individuals against 
the demands of community, but instead safeguards rules of civility that in some significant 
measure constitute both individuals and community[,J" and "[t]he most plausible interpretation of 
this legal structure is that the Restatement has empowered plaintiffs to use the tort to uphold the 
interests of social personality .... "). 
347. See id. at 965. 
348. [d. at 963 (discussing E. Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in 
INTERACTION RITuAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR (1967». 
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An articulable theory of privacy was not Post's concern, but his 
central insight is a natural byproduct of privacy-as-trust. He argues that 
the tort of intrusion is meant to safeguard the social norms that permit 
social interaction, what he calls "civility rules."349 Traditional theories 
of privacy would orient the tort around the protection of an individual's 
right to be in control of information dissemination and his right to be let 
alone or take a respite from society. 350 Post reorients the tort around its 
social purposes. Post's argument runs along the same path as privacy-as-
trust because it reflects the role of trust and discretion in sharing and 
disclosure. And both offer workable solutions for judges to address pri-
vacy law problems. 
Finally, trust is already a central part of other areas of law; its inte-
gration into the law of privacy is, therefore, not only reasonable but also 
rather unremarkable. Trust is manifested in contract law through the law 
of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant, which exists behind every 
contract, codifies the trust we have that our contracting partners will 
fulfill their obligations and not prevent us from receiving the benefits 
due us under the contract. No contracting party can predict every eventu-
ality, so ethnomethodologists argue that every contract has an "et cetera 
assumption": unspoken yet generally understood assumptions about 
interaction and future contingent actions.351 Requirements of good faith 
and fair dealing reflect this "et cetera assumption. "352 The sociologist 
Randall Collins argued that this and other noncontractual elements of 
contracts and interaction are largely based on trust. 353 After all, if two 
parties never trusted each other, it is hard to imagine a contract ever 
being completed between them; they would either give up or attempt to 
reduce to writing every conceivable contingency, making the project 
349. Id. at 963-64. 
350. See. e.g., id. at 958-59. 
351. See. e.g., Harold Garfinkel, Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities, II 
Soc. PROBS. 225, 247-48 (1964). 
352. The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is a well-known feature of modern 
contract law. See. e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). Section 1-203 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.c.") provides: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes 
an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203 (2012). Under the 
U.c.e., "good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2012). A comprehensive review of the duty of 
good faith is impossible in this space and, in any event, beyond the scope of this paper. The duty 
arises in a plethora of contexts. See. e.g., Robert S. Summers, The Conceptualisation of Good 
Faith in American Contract Law: A General Account, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT 
LAW 118, 119 (Reinhard Zimmerman & Simon Whittaker eds., 2000); E. Allan Farnsworth, Good 
Faith in Contract Performance, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 153, 153-55 (Jack 
Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995). 
353. RANDALL COLLINS, SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT: AN INTRODUcnON TO NON-OBVIOUS 
SOCIOLOGY 11-12 (1982). 
616 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 69:559 
unworkable.354 Trust is "sociallife['s] ... fundamental basis"355 for this 
precise reason. 
Trust is also at the core of the law of privilege: the attorney-client, 
doctor-patient, and husband-wife privileges, among others, exist because 
of the paradigms of trust implied in those relationships.356 And trade-
mark law is meant to protect brand goodwill-the trust that consumers 
have that certain manufacturers produce quality products.357 Alongside 
the practical, empirical, and theoretical benefits of the privacy-as-trust 
approach, the relative familiarity the law has with trust suggests that my 
argument for refocusing privacy law will be functional, as well. 
IV. ApPLYING PRIVACY-AS-TRUST: A CASE STUDY IN PRIVACY LAW 
Privacy-as-trust is a pragmatic, sociological approach to under-
standing privacy in the information-sharing context and to crafting a 
legal response to the problem of protecting privacy in a world where 
sharing with third parties is inevitable. The theory captures our intuitive 
sense about intrusions into privacy and reflects social science evidence 
of our actual behavior. It then links them together into a single doc-
trine-namely, that because trust is both an essential element of social 
interaction and at the core of our sense of invasion of privacy, privacy 
law should protect, foster, and incentivize disclosures in situations of 
trust. That doctrinal coherence offers judges a workable path for resolv-
ing questions of privacy law around three principles. 
First, sharing is a good thing. The law of privacy should encourage 
it by fostering sharing in contexts of trust. Second, trust can exist among 
friends and intimates as a result of past experience, but trust can also 
reasonably exist among strangers based on strong overlapping networks 
and identity sharing. Third, after identifying the nature of the relation-
ship between the parties involved, judges should look to the presence of 
354. See id. 
355. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 178 (Steven Lukes ed., W.D. 
Halls trans., 2014). 
356. See, e.g., Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386, 1390 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,733) 
("When a client employs a[n] attorney, he has a right to presume, if the latter be silent on the 
point, that he has no engagements, which interfere, in any degree, with his exclusive devotion to 
the cause confided to him; that he has no interest, which may betray his judgment, or endanger his 
fidelity."); Blough v. Wellman, 974 P.2d 70, 72 (Idaho 1999) (''The relationship of client and 
attorney is one of trust, binding an attorney to the utmost good faith in fair dealing with his client, 
and obligating the attorney to discharge that trust with complete fairness, honor, honesty, loyalty, 
and fidelity."). 
357. See Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REv. 761, 773 (2013) 
(recognizing "the dual mission at the core of trademark law: both to protect producers' 
investments in goodwill (by giving them a property-like right in the symbol of that goodwill) and 
to protect consumers so they can be confident in their purchasing decisions (by imposing tort-like 
liability for conduct that deceives consumers)"). 
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indicia of trust from the totality of the circumstances to determine 
whether a given disclosure was made in a context of trust. If so, the 
sharer should retain a privacy interest in the information disclosed; if 
not, the privacy interest is extinguished. 
If trust is at the core of information privacy, then the remedy for 
invasions of privacy should remedy the breach of trust. And if, as the 
theory and social science evidence suggest, trust can exist or be 
breached (and privacy can be maintained or invaded) among intimates as 
well as strangers, then the remedy for invasions of privacy should be 
similarly broad in scope. This doctrine may have significant implica-
tions, all of which merit further research.358 This Article focuses on 
applying privacy-as-trust when personal information is shared with other 
private parties. 
Fortunately, the trust-based tort of breach of confidentiality, which 
has a long tradition in Anglo-American common law, can provide a 
clear, practical path forward for victims of privacy invasions and for 
judges looking for answers to vexing problems of modem privacy. 
Stunted in American law by various contingent historical factors-Wil-
liam Prosser's failure to include it in his article on "privacy torts," 
among other reasons359-the breach of confidentiality tort unleashes us 
from traditional privacy scholarship and reflects the meaning and impli-
cations of privacy-as-trust. It focuses not on the individual or the nature 
of the information shared, but rather on the social relationship in which 
the information is shared. Neil Richards and Dan Solove recount the 
history of the tort of breach of confidentiality, showing how embedded it 
is in Anglo-American law, and propose a rejuvenation of the tort in the 
United States by importing modem confidence jurisprudence from Brit-
ain.360 Some scholars, most recently, Woodrow Hartzog, have proposed 
using the tort to protect privacy,361 while others have suggested that it 
358. I explored some of the implications of privacy-as-trust in my doctoral dissertation, 
Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World, in the Department of 
Sociology at Columbia University. See Waldman, supra note 310. 
359. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 156-58 (2007). Prosser's inclusion of only four privacy torts-
intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, and appropriation-in his 
article, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960), and in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
(1977), for which he served as the lead contributor, had the effect of cementing these torts-and 
no others-as the framework for privacy law in the United States. Richards & Solove, supra at 
151-52. 
360. Richards & Solove, supra note 359, at 133-45, 181-82. 
361. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763, 765 
(2014) (calling for a "revitalization of' the confidentiality tort, Hartzog "argue[s] that the concept 
of implied confidentiality has not been developed enough to be consistently applied in 
environments that often lack obvious physical or linguistic cues of confidence, such as the 
Internet"); Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social 
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would not do much good.362 I would like to build on Hartzog's and 
others' work to show how the tort of breach of confidentiality is pre-
mised on particularized social trust and propose modifications to the tort 
based on the lessons of this Article. I then apply the tort of breach of 
confidentiality to determine when we should retain privacy interests in 
previously disclosed information. 
A. The Tort of Breach of Confidentiality 
The tort for breach of confidentiality is premised on particularized 
social trust and would impose liability when someone who is expected 
to keep confidences divulges them. I propose that the claim would have 
three elements: A successful plaintiff would need to prove that (1) the 
information is not trivial or already widely known; (2) the original dis-
closure happened in a context that indicated a confidence; and (3) the 
use of the information caused an articulable, though not necessarily indi-
vidualized, harm. These elements are based on the work of Professors 
Richards and Solove363 and Helen Nissenbaum's theory of privacy as 
contextual integrity,364 but the claim construct departs from those influ-
ences to incorporate the lessons of privacy-as-trust. Those lessons are 
that we expect to retain privacy even after initial disclosures; that stran-
gers can receive information in contexts of trust reasonably based on 
identity, strong overlapping networks, and other indicia of trust given 
the totality of the circumstances; and that, as injuries to trusting relation-
ships, privacy harms may antedate any specific, personalized, or defam-
atory effects. Admittedly, this proposal would take privacy tort law in a 
new direction; but a reorientation is necessary to protect personal pri-
vacy in a networked world filled with both involuntary and voluntary 
disclosures. 
Confidentiality law has always been premised on particularized 
social trust, as described in privacy-as-trust. For example, the centuries-
Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1174 (1992) ("I suggest that the privacy tort be 
formally interred, and that we look to the concept of breach of confidence to provide legally 
enforceable protection from dissemination of identified types of personal information."); Diane L. 
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 
CORNELL L. REv. 291, 363 (1983) ("More thought should also be given to increasing the use of 
legal sanctions for the violation of special confidential relationships, in order to give individuals 
greater control over the dissemination of personal information."). 
362. Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of 
Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REv. I, 3 (1995) ("[W)hile contract and fiduciary based actions may 
occasionally offer relief to a breach of confidence plaintiff who seeks to recover for the revelation 
of the details of her private life, they have so far proved unattractive remedies, their effectiveness 
cramped by formal requirements and inadequate damages."). 
363. See Richards & Solove, supra note 359. 
364. See generally NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 18. 
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old common law evidentiary privileges,365 where confidentiality law got 
its start,366 prohibit one party to a special relationship from revealing the 
other's secrets in court. As the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly, the 
attorney-client privilege "encourage[s] full and frank cornmunication"367 
and allows both parties to feel safe to share facts, details, and impres-
sions without fear of disclosure; that is, it protects the relationship and 
puts the weight of the law behind each party's expectation that the other 
will behave with discretion. The same is true for spousal privilege, 
which protects "marital confidences" because they are "essential to the 
preservation of the marriage relationship .... "368 Other special relation-
ships that traditionally warranted confidentiality and discretion-such as 
those between a doctor and patient, a clergyman and penitent, a principal 
and agent, a trustor and trustee, a parent and child,369 to name just a 
few-are all premised on the expectation that the parties will continue to 
behave in a manner that protects the disclosing party's confidences. 
Notably, the kind of trust at the foundation of special relationship 
privileges is precisely the kind of particularized social trust that I argue 
is at the heart of privacy. We trust that our attorneys, doctors, confes-
sors, and other fiduciaries will keep our confidences not because we 
have long historical data sets that over time prove they do not divulge 
our secrets. Rather, confidentiality is the norm because of expertise, 
strong overlapping networks, and transference. Lawyers,370 doctors,371 
and priests,372 for example, have canons of ethics that promise confiden-
365. The attorney-client privilege is the oldest, dating back to 1576. See Berd v. Lovelace, 
(1576-77) 21 Eng. Rep. 33; Austen v. Vesey, (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 34; Hartford v. Lee, (1577-78) 
21 Eng. Rep.; Kelway v. Kelway, (1579-80) 21 Eng. Rep. 47; Creed v. Trap, (1578-79) 21 Eng. 
Rep. 74; Dennis v. Codrington, (1579-80) 21 Eng. Rep. 53; Strelly v. Albany, (1582-83) 21 Eng. 
Rep. 95. 
366. See Richards & Solove, supra note 359, at 134. 
367. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 
U.S. 464, 470 (1888). 
368. See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (emphasis added). 
369. Richards & Solove, supra note 359, at 135. 
370. AM. B. ASS'N, A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1937), available at http:// 
www.arnericanbar.org/contentidam/abaimigrated/cpr/mrpc/Canons_Ethics.authcheckdam.pdf 
("Canon 37. Confidences of a Client. It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. 
This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees; and neither of 
them should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these 
confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his employees or to the disadvantage 
of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even tough [sic] there are other available 
sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers that 
this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client."). 
371. The modern version of the Hippocratic Oath, written by Dr. Louis Lasgana, states, in part: 
"I will respect the privacy of my patients, for their problems are not disclosed to me that the world 
may know." Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001), http:// 
www.pbs.orglwgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html. 
372. Code o/Canon Law, VATICAN, http://www.vatican.vaiarchiveIENGII04CP3G.HTM (last 
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tiality. We tend to choose our physicians and lawyers, at least, based on 
personal recommendations from our embedded networks.373 We ask 
close friends and those we know well and then transfer the trust we have 
in them to the professionals they recommend. Particularized social trust, 
therefore, is at the heart of these relationships, and the law of evidentiary 
privileges is meant to protect that trust. 
Confidentiality law reflects privacy-as-trust even as British confi-
dentiality jurisprudence has unmoored the tort from the narrow confines 
of particular relationships. Professors Richards and Solove cite several 
cases, many of which were dual intellectual property and confidential 
relationship cases, to show that the required relationships were never 
very narrow.374 Those relationships have become even more attenuated 
in modern British confidentiality law, which only hinges on "'the 
acceptance of the information on the basis that it will be kept 
secret .... ' "375 Consider the 1969 case of Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engi-
neers), Ltd., 376 which, according to Richards and Solove, "crystalized" 
British confidence law.377 Coco involved a trade secret, but the court 
took the opportunity to define the three elements necessary for a breach 
of confidentiality claim: The information (1) needs" 'the necessary qual-
ity of confidence about it' "; it (2) "'must have been imparted in circum-
stances importing an obligation of confidence"'; and (3) there must be 
some use of the information to the disclosing party's" 'detriment.' "378 
Richards and Solove show that subsequent case law has shown these 
categories to be quite broad; the "quality of confidence" prong merely 
means that the information is "neither trivial nor in the public 
domain,"379 and the "circumstances" prong extends beyond defined rela-
visited Feb. 21, 2015) (Canon 983 § 1 reads: ''The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore it is 
absolutely forbidden for a confessor to betray in any way a penitent in words or in any manner and 
for any reason."). 
373. See Roni Caryn Rabin, You Can Find Dr. Right, with Some Effon, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.coml2008/09/30lhealth/30find.html. 
374. See Richards & Solove, supra note 359, at 136--38 (citing Duke of Queensberry v. 
Shebbeare, (1758) 28 Eng. Rep. 924 (involving unpublished manuscripts); Yovatt v. Winyard, 
(1820) 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (involving medicinal recipes); Abernethy v. Hutchinson, (1825) 47 Eng. 
Rep. 1313 (involving lecture notes); Pollard v. Photographic Co., [1888] 40 Ch. D. 345 (U.K.) 
(involving photographs); Prince Albert v. Strange, (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (involving 
etchings)). Even though these cases all involved intellectual property, many of them are regarded 
by historians and legal scholars as seminal confidentiality cases as well. See FRANCIS GURRY, 
BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 47 (1984) ("Undoubtedly most of the references in the cases to 
confidential information as property are metaphorical."). 
375. Richards & Solove, supra note 359, at 160 (quoting Stephens v. Avery, [1988] W.L.R. 
1280 (U.K.)). 
376. [1969] R.P.C. 41 (U.K.). 
377. Richards & Solove, supra note 359, at 161. 
378. [d. at 161 (quoting Coco, R.P.C. at 47). 
379. [d. at 162. 
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tionships and even to friends.380 The "damage" prong has never been 
clearly explained, but it appears that British law does not require the 
kind of specific, particularized harm that is common to American tort 
law.381 
This jurisprudence reflects many of the lessons of privacy-as-trust. 
By definition, the tort recognizes that we can retain privacy interests in 
information already disclosed because the tort holds the subsequent dis-
seminators liable. Most importantly, it distinguishes between the disclo-
sure contexts of trust and wider publicity.382 Privacy-as-trust would 
extend the British cases from beyond friends to even the social obliga-
tions that arise among acquaintances and strangers, cabined by the pres-
ence of the indicia of trust of strong overlapping networks, identity, and 
expertise. This jurisprudence should also extend beyond cases involving 
traditional defamatory or reputation damages that result from wide dis-
semination of information. Under privacy-as-trust and confidentiality 
law, the breach of confidence is an invasion of privacy because of the 
damage the breach has done to our expectations and relationships. 
Even though the tort so conceived would not fit within traditional 
privacy scholarship's individual "right against the world" perspective,383 
our modem socio-technological world requires us to rethink the conven-
tional wisdom. Private parties and public agencies maintain massive 
"digital dossiers" about US,384 Internet service providers and other digital 
platforms hold large amounts of our personal data and may use it to our 
detriment,385 and the voluntary and required disclosures associated with 
online social networking give other users unprecedented access to our 
personal histories and information. Brandeis and Warren may have been 
acutely aware of the invasive tendencies of an aggressive yellow press, 
but the newer risks to personal privacy require innovative solutions that 
the tort for breach of confidentiality may be able to provide. 
B. Further Disclosure of Previously Revealed Information 
One of those risks to personal privacy arises when an individual 
380. Id. at 163-64. 
381. Id. at 164 ("[S]ubsequent courts have been relatively reluctant both to define the requisite 
level of injury required and even to state with certainty whether detriment is required as an 
absolute matter in all cases."). For a detailed summary and analysis of the case law fleshing out 
the breach of confidentiality tort in modern Britain, see id. at 166-73. See also GURRY, supra note 
374. 
382. See Richards & Solove, supra note 359, at 165 ("The determination of whether something 
is in the public domain, however, is a question of degree .... "). 
383. See, e.g., supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text. 
384. See DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 24, at 1-7,90-106, and passim. 
385. See Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified 
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 105, 105-24 (2010). 
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discloses personal information to another person or a small group of 
people. This happens often: for example, we share information with 
friends, loved ones, or coworkers. In today's networked world, we share 
extraordinary amounts of personal information with websites, mobile 
apps, and Internet intermediaries. Of particular concern is the phenome-
non commonly known as "revenge porn," or the dissemination of inti-
mate or sexually graphic images of others without their consent.386 This 
often occurs when a jilted lover lashes out after the end of a relationship 
by taking the intimate images of his former partner and posting them 
online. The effects are devastating, as Danielle Keats Citron has shown 
in her recent book, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace.387 At its core, revenge 
porn is harassment, but it is also an example of an invasion of privacy 
when privacy is based on trust: a victim shared personal information (a 
risque image) with a trusted individual (an intimate partner) in a context 
vf trust only to see that information widely disseminated to disastrous 
effects. Thus, the tort of breach of confidentiality may be an effective 
weapon in many minimal disclosure cases. 
The general rule of thumb in American privacy law is that the indi-
vidual disclosing information assumes the risk of further disclosure and 
thus has no recourse when the recipient of information disseminates it to 
a wider audience. But privacy-as-trust would hold that, in certain con-
texts, when someone reveals private information to one or several per-
sons, he or she could reasonably expect that the recipients would not 
disseminate the information any further. Therefore, a third party's fur-
ther disclosure of that information-this time to a different and, likely, 
larger audience-could constitute an invasion of privacy and a breach of 
confidentiality. 
Currently, some courts do not accept this idea at all, and, when 
others do, there appears to be no coherent scheme for judging when a 
previous disclosure leaves a privacy interest intact. Lior Strahilevitz 
addressed these issues in his insightful and powerful article, A Social 
Network Theory of Privacy, arguing that social science literature on 
information dissemination through social networks could give judges an 
articulable, quantitative method for adjudicating limited privacy 
cases.388 Professor Strahilevitz's work puts us on a path toward a more 
just and fair privacy jurisprudence. However, his theory is weaker than 
privacy-as-trust and may fail to protect personal privacy where trust 
exists among strangers and where different social networks approach a 
386. See generally Mary Anne Franks, Combatting Non-Consensual Pornography: A Working 
Paper (Sept. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com!abstract=2336537. 
387. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 1-8 (2014). 
388. Strahilevitz, supra note 17, at 921. 
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given piece of information differently. I propose that a robust breach of 
confidentiality tort informed by British law and the principles of 
privacy-as-trust would better protect personal privacy and offer judges a 
clear, practical tool for adjudicating these cases. 
Several cases illustrate the danger and lack of coherence in the cur-
rent law, many of which formed the basis for Professor Strahilevitz's 
social network theory. I will use some of those same cases here to illus-
trate the contrast with privacy-as-trust. In Sanders v. ABC, Inc.,389 the 
California Supreme Court found that an undercover news reporter vio-
lated one of her subject's privacy interests in the content of his conversa-
tions with her when she broadcast those conversations on television?90 
ABC argued, however, that any privacy right was extinguished by the 
simple fact that the subject's co-workers had been present and overheard 
the broadcasted conversations.391 The court disagreed. Privacy, the court 
said, "is not a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic .... 'The mere fact 
that a person can be seen by someone does not automatically mean that 
he or she can legally be forced to be subject to being seen by every-
one.' "392 The concept of limited privacy allowed the court to distinguish 
between information that was public only as to several co-workers ver-
sus information publicized to the broadcast audience of ABC News. 
A similar question was resolved in a similar way in Y.G. v. Jewish 
Hospital of St. Louis393 and Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach. 394 In 
Y.G., a young couple that underwent in vitro fertilization in violation of 
the doctrines espoused by their conservative church found their images 
on the nightly news after attending a gathering at their hospital?95 Prior 
to the segment, only hospital employees and a parent knew of their plans 
to have a family, and the young couple was assured that only hospital 
employees and other participants in the in vitro fertilization program 
would be attending the party. 396 The court rejected the argument that the 
couple's attendance at the party waived their privacy rights, holding that 
the couple "clearly chose to disclose their participation to only the other 
389. 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999). 
390. [d. at 69. 
391. [d. at 73-75. 
392. [d. at 72 (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PuBLICITY AND PRIVACY 
§ 5.1O(A)(2) (1998)). 
393. 795 SW.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
394. 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). Both this and f.G. appear to be the seminal cases on 
the subject, as Strahilevitz cites them in his article and Dan Solove marshals them in his casebook 
on privacy. See Strahilevitz, supra note 17, at 933 n.34; DANIEL 1. SOLOVE & PAUL M. 
SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 117-18 (4th ed. 2011). 
395. f.G., 795 S.W.2d at 492-93. 
396. [d. at 492. 
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in vitro couples."397 "By so attending this limited gathering, they did not 
waive their right to keep their condition and the process of in vitro pri-
vate, in respect to the general public."398 In Kubach, an mY-positive 
man who had disclosed his status to friends, health care personnel, and 
his HIV support group retained a privacy interest in his identity.399 The 
court reasoned that a television station could not defy its promise to 
pixilate his face merely because of Kubach's previous disclosures 
because those disclosures were only to those who "cared about him and! 
or because they also had AIDS. "400 Kubach, the court said, could expect 
that those in whom he confided would not further disclose his 
condition.401 
And then there are those cases that reject limited privacy. In permit-
ting agents of General Motors to interview associates of Ralph Nader 
and use the information they gathered under false pretenses to discredit 
him and his criticisms of the company, a court held that "[i]nformation 
about the plaintiff which was already known to others could hardly be 
regarded as private .... "402 Similarly, in an ironically well-publicized 
case, a Michigan court found that Consuelo Sanchez Duran, the Colom-
bian judge who indicted drug kingpin Pablo Escobar, had no privacy 
right in her post-relocation Detroit address.403 She used her real name 
when shopping and leasing an apartment and told several curious neigh-
bors why she had security guards.404 The court said that these actions 
rendered her identity "open to the public eye."40S 
The results of these cases vary. But most importantly, there seems 
to be no coherent and consistent way of determining when a previous 
disclosure extinguishes a right to privacy. Rights-based theories are of 
little help. Sharers freely and voluntarily disclose information to others, 
and privacy theories based on separation, secrecy, and exclusion cannot 
adequately extend beyond an initial disclosure. They would either give 
individuals unlimited power over disclosure or justify the rigid bright-
line rules that characterized Nader and Duran. In cases like Y.G. and 
Kubach, a central animator of the holdings was the fact that the plain-
tiffs' free and voluntary agreements to attend the hospital party or go on 
397. Id. at 502. 
398. Id. 
399. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d at 494. 
400. Id. 
401. Id. ("Although there was testimony that plaintiff did not explicitly tell his friends and 
family not to tell anyone else, there was also testimony that they understood that plaintiffs 
condition was not something they would discuss indiscriminately."). 
402. Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970). 
403. Duran v. Detroit News, Inc., 504 N.w.2d 715, 720 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
404. Id. at 718. 
405. Id. at 720. 
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television, respectively, depended upon the defendants' assurances that 
their identities would not be publicized.406 They never chose to be iden-
tified, and, therefore, the publicity violated their right to choose to be 
private. This makes little sense as a workable theory of privacy. It would 
grant individuals total control over a right that must be balanced against 
others and offers no instruction on where to draw the line between suffi-
cient and insufficient publicity. 
Professor Strahilevitz argues that we can rely on social network 
theory-or the likelihood that a given piece of information would work 
its way through a given group of persons and transfer to a wider audi-
ence-to answer these previous disclosure questions.407 In Kubach, the 
plaintiff had told medical professionals as well as friends and family 
about his HIV -positive status.408 Strahilevitz concludes that since norms 
prevent patient information from flowing from doctors and since several 
studies suggest that HIV-status information is rarely divulged outside of 
certain tight networks, the information was unlikely to get out on its 
own.409 Therefore, Kubach had a privacy interest on which he could sue 
ABC for its wide dissemination of his private information. Strahilevitz 
finds Y.G. harder to decide.410 He has no study on how knowledge of in 
vitro fertilization travels in a network. Instead, he relies on the assump-
tion that "there appears to be less stigma associated with in vitro fertili-
zation" than, say, HIV status.411 The pertinent information-that the 
couple was using in vitro fertilization in contravention of their religious 
community's wishes-was hard to piece together, so not many people at 
the gathering would be privy to it. And many of the participants would 
have been either co-participants or health care providers and thus less 
likely to spread the news. Strahilevitz found the court's decision to rec-
ognize a privacy interest "defensible," though not a slam dunk under 
social network theory.412 
Social network theory, however, would say Duran came out 
406. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) 
("Moreover, defendant explicitly agreed to respect plaintiff's privacy in order to secure his 
participation in the show."); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 501 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1990) ("The plaintiffs alleged in their petition that they were 'assured' that 'no publicity nor 
public exposure' would occur, that they twice refused interviews or to be filmed, and made every 
reasonable effort to avoid being filmed, and that no one knew of their reproductive process other 
than Y.G.'s mother. They stated that the function dealing with the in vitro function was a 'private' 
affair in which the public had no legitimate interest."). 
407. Strahilevitz, supra note 17, at 970-71. 
408. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d at 494. 
409. Strahilevitz, supra note 17, at 977. 
410. [d. 
411. [d. at 978. 
412. [d. (discussing Duran v. Detroit News, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993». 
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wrong.413 Strahilevitz notes that shopping and eating in restaurants are 
"weak-ties interactions," so using one's real name would only become 
interesting and likely to spread through a network if a waiter was able to 
piece together that the woman to whom he just served salad was the 
Colombian judge who indicted Pablo Escobar.414 "Perhaps," Strahilevitz 
notes, "a Colombian waiter would have put two and two together," but 
the interactions were too fleeting and the information too complex to be 
likely to get out and reach a wide audience.415 
None of Professor Strahilevitz's conclusions are unreasonable. In 
fact, they make a great deal of sense in part because of the attractive 
elements of his social network theory. Like Helen Nissenbaum's privacy 
as contextual integrity, a social network theory elevates the social con-
text of a given interaction over formal rules and the mere fact of disclo-
sure. It also highlights the important role social science can play in 
adjudicating modem legal questions. But there remains a question of 
evidence. Strahilevitz never states how lawyers would go about proving 
complexity of information, how fast or slow a given piece of informa-
tion would flow in a network, or how to identify important nodes in a 
network. Absent substantial evidence from network theorists and social 
scientists, we are left with assumptions and a judge's personal views, 
which would further marginalize populations whose networks look very 
different from those of mainstream members of the American judiciary. 
A friend going through in vitro fertilization might be a rather ordinary 
piece of information for a network of young persons, progressive 
women, and members of the LGBT community. The same could hardly 
be said for radically different networks of radically different people. 
A social network theory of privacy also has a problematic relation-
ship with strangers. Although Professor Strahilevitz never explicitly 
argues that strangers automatically extinguish privacy rights, the practi-
cal effect of his social network theory, based as it is on the likelihood 
that information would escape its intended group of recipients, would, at 
a minimum, make it exceedingly easy for judges to hinge loss of privacy 
interests when strangers receive information we share.416 But that should 
not be the case: trust can exist among strangers. Privacy-as-trust would 
amend Strahilevitz's network theory to appreciate the context of infor-
mation sharing with strangers and retain privacy interests in information 
shared with strangers who nevertheless exist in a relationship of trust 
413. [d. 
414. [d. at 979. 
415. [d. 
416. [d. at 974. 
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and discretion. The tort for breach of confidentiality may provide a 
clear, practical alternative. 
Armed with the tools of privacy-as-trust and the confidentiality tort, 
we can consider these cases anew. Currently, the cases are resolved 
using either a bright-line rule that extinguishes privacy after a minor 
disclosure to even one person or, to use Professor Strahilevitz's phrase, 
"an ad hoc, 'I know it when 1 see it' standard."417 Ralph Nader and 
Consuelo Sanchez Duran told several people information about them-
selves, and a bright-line disclosure rule extinguished any remaining pri-
vacy interest in that information as against the world.418 But, under 
privacy-as-trust, what matters is not the mere fact that Mr. Nader and 
Ms. Duran told something to others, but rather the context in which they 
told it. It is not clear from the record in Nader the exact nature of the 
questions asked and the exact relationships between the interviewees 
and Mr. Nader; the court only referred to them as "friend[s] or acquain-
tance[s]."419 However, we know from British confidentiality law that an 
obligation of confidence can arise amidst disclosures to friends.420 
Duran also makes clear that Ms. Duran only told a few neighbors why 
she needed security guards and used her real name to lease a home.421 
The nature of the information, not to mention the minimal disclosure to 
a close-knit group, would engender trust against further disclosure and 
may satisfy the requirements of the confidentiality tort. 
In Sanders, ABC had argued that it could broadcast the conversa-
tion in question because several of Sanders's co-workers overheard it.422 
The substance of the clip was rather banal: Sanders noted that he used to 
be a stand-up comedian and that he was hardly enamored with his cur-
rent job doing over-the-phone psychic readings.423 Given the original 
audience and the lack of anything newsworthy or interesting in the con-
versation, Professor Strahilevitz's social network theory would suggest 
that it is highly unlikely that such information would have been widely 
disseminated but for the ABC news report.424 Here, the result under pri-
vacy-as-trust and the confidentiality tort would be the same: Sanders felt 
comfortable disclosing information because the few people around-his 
work associates-were trusted to exercise the appropriate discretion 
417. [d. at 973. 
418. See Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970); Duran v. Detroit News, 
Inc., 504 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
419. Nader, 255 N.E.2d at 770. 
420. Richards & Solove, supra note 359, at 160-64. 
421. Duran, 504 N.W.2d at 718. 
422. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 73-74 (Cal. 1999). 
423. See id. at 69; Strahilevitz, supra note 17, at 976. 
424. Strahilevitz, supra note 17, at 976. 
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about whatever non-work information they happened to overhear. Thus, 
a privacy interest would remain. 
Kubach and Y.G. may have been about juicer bits of information, 
but privacy-as-trust would protect their rights against further disclosure 
as well. Kubach was about HIV -status disclosure-something that Shel-
ley found is usually only disclosed in an environment contextualized by 
trust.425 This kind of information has also been found to be the kind of 
information that would give rise to an obligation of confidence under 
British law.426 Therefore, especially given the social, political, and pub-
lic health benefits associated with disclosure, privacy-as-trust and confi-
dentiality tort would note the strong trust that exists in an HIV support 
group and therefore both protect Kubach's privacy and help foster the 
trust and discretion that permits HIV -status disclosure in the first place. 
The breach of confidentiality tort would be satisfied: the information has 
the necessary confidential quality, it was only disclosed to friends, doc-
tors, and an HIV support group, and its dissemination could do signifi-
cant damage. Similarly, in Y.G., the attendance at the hospital gathering 
that included only other in vitro fertilization couples and hospital per-
sonnel suggests that any information disclosed there was done in an 
environment of trust,427 much like Kubach disclosing his status to a sup-
port group or to fellow members of the HIV-positive community.428 The 
couple in Y.G. shared with other attendees what they thought was a stig-
matizing social identity; they became a network of shared identity even 
though they were "strangers" in the traditional sense of the word. More-
over, the hospital staff could also be trusted as experts in their fields. 
Privacy-as-trust and the confidentiality tort would both protect the 
couple's privacy and encourage them to seek the support of others. 
Privacy focused on trust better protects the socially beneficial 
effects of sharing and gives judges a coherent scheme for answering 
limited privacy questions. It reflects our intuitive understanding of the 
injustice of bright-line rules extinguishing privacy rights after one dis-
closure. Furthermore, it understands the importance of context in sharing 
behavior. In these ways, a breach of confidentiality tort that accepts that 
trust and discretion can exist among relative strangers would provide an 
effective antidote to the current confusion on privacy. 
425. Shelley, supra note 319, at 203-04, 208-1l. 
426. See Richards & Solove, supra note 359, at 165 (citing R.G. TOULSON & C.M. PHIPPS, 
CONFIDENTIALITY 41 (1996»; see also TOULSON & PHIpps, supra at 145-64. 
427. Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 492 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
428. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
We are accustomed to thinking about information privacy in lim-
ited ways. Despite their liberating potential, conceptions of privacy 
based on separation and exclusion, intimacy and deviance, and per-
sonhood and autonomy end up damaging our ability to protect our per-
sonal information in a world of sharing. At times, these theories are 
inelastic; they draw bright-line rules that have the perverse effect of tak-
ing away personal privacy rights. At other times, these theories are so 
narrowed by normative judgments that they circumscribe privacy in too 
tight a noose. Unsatisfied with this, Professor Solove issued a challenge 
to privacy scholars-take a bottom-up, pragmatic approach to under-
standing privacy. This Article accepts that challenge and, using lessons 
from Helen Nissenbaum, Lior Strahilevitz, and others, argues that infor-
mation privacy is really about trust. A more robust version of the tort for 
breach of confidentiality may offer some additional protection for per-
sonal privacy, particularly in the context of information sharing. 
Privacy-as-trust has wide policy implications. As I argued above, it 
offers judges a clear path to adjudicate information privacy cases, and it 
suggests that a robust breach of confidentiality tort may be an effective 
weapon against the scourge of "revenge porn" and other information 
dissemination cases. It can be used by victims of cyberharassment when 
embarrassing, intimate, or stigmatizing videos are publicized. It also can 
affect any aspect of the law that focuses on publicity or publicness 
because it tries to draw a line between public and nonpublic information. 
More research is needed to determine if privacy-as-trust can apply in 
other contexts, such as intellectual property contexts-namely, whether 
disclosure of inventions for testing, experimentation, or work among 
colleagues constitutes "public use" in patent law.429 Privacy-as-trust 
may also complicate the conventional wisdom that allows online actors 
to remain anonymous and may even change our understanding of how 
the Fourth Amendment responds to new technologies. 
Some might argue that privacy-as-trust replaces one elusive term-
privacy-with another-trust-and, therefore, does little to clarify a 
vexing and varied concept. There is undoubtedly disagreement among 
social scientists about the nature and determinants of trust, but I have 
endeavored to clarify the argument in this Article by showing how there 
is remarkable uniformity at the core of trust literature. I have also nar-
rowed the scope of the discussion to the information-sharing context and 
429. 35 U.S.c. § 102(a)(l) (20\2). This topic is explored in a forthcoming article, Ari Ezra 
Waldman, Social Network Norms and Intellectual Property (Mar. 30, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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provided tools for practical implementation through the tort of breach of 
confidentiality. 
Seeing privacy as a behavioral exchange of trust and discretion will 
undoubtedly change how we talk about privacy and, as I have discussed, 
give judges and legal policymakers clear paths to address certain privacy 
questions. Privacy-as-trust aims to reorient the way we think and write 
about information privacy. One of its goals is to break convention and 
inspire further study. But its primary goal is the protection of privacy in 
a digital world where information flows are instantaneous, inexpensive, 
and constant. Situating privacy within its social role is a necessary step 
toward answering questions posed by Internet, mobile, and future, as yet 
unimagined, technologies. Sometimes, protecting privacy in this world 
can feel like tilting at a windmill. But that is only true if we think about 
privacy in its conventional form. Internet and digital technologies have 
tapped into an innate human desire to share. Privacy studies should not 
resist that; they should embrace it. 
